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Introduction 
Research question 
The topic for this thesis is urban economic agglomeration and polarization. The thesis takes 
the form of a qualitative research project with the current process of economic 
agglomeration in the municipality of Chacao in Caracas, Venezuela as a case. Within the 
poverty-ridden city of Caracas, an affluent business district is developing on the territory of 
Chacao. The aim of the project is to understand what the causes and consequences of this 
agglomeration are in an urban context characterized by stark socio-economic differences. 
The research question for the study has the following formulation:  
- What are the causes of the agglomeration of private investments in the 
municipality of Chacao and how does that agglomeration relate to inter-
municipal polarization in Caracas? 
 
Academic and social relevance  
Much literature on contemporary changes in urban form suggests that recent developments 
in information and communications technologies (ICTs) herald the end of agglomeration 
economies. The study of a contemporary urban agglomeration process is therefore an 
interesting way to shed new light on the complex relationship between ICTs and the 
dynamics of urban geographies. In times of economic and political restructuring it is also 
important to understand the role of new strategies for urban governance in the 
transformation of urban geographies. A global economy with fewer constraints on private 
capital poses new challenges for city planning and it is important to understand how private 
investments affect the development of cities. For cities in the South such an understanding is 
especially important as limited resources could lead governments faced with the lure of 
foreign capital investments to opt for policies that might compromise longer-term 
development goals.  
 A particular focus for this study is uneven intra-urban development. A large 
percentage of the world’s poor are already living in cities, and while urbanization levels are 
rising world-wide with over half of the world’s population already living in urban 
environments, three-quarters of global population growth occurs in urban areas in the South. 
 1
This means that poverty in the South increasingly needs to be addressed as an urban issue, 
and in this respect social differences and intra-urban polarization are important topics that 
call for more research.  
 In a report on Venezuela from 1997, the World Bank asserts that, “As the most 
urbanized nation in LAC (92%) efficient and equitable urban centers are critical to 
Venezuela's sustainable development” (World Bank 1997, iv). Along the same lines a UN 
report on cities in the global economy (UNCHS 2001) draws attention to how social 
contrasts are increasing within cities across the world. The coexistence of thriving business 
districts, affluent neighborhoods and slums show that economic growth is not always a 
solution to poverty. According to the report, new geographies of centrality and marginality 
are appearing on an intra-urban scale as the downtown areas of metropolitan districts may 
receive massive investments in real estate and telecommunications while low-income areas 
are starved for resources. The contrast between Chacao and its surroundings in Caracas 
provides an exemplary illustration of such emerging geographies of difference.  
 
The structure of this thesis 
The thesis has 5 chapters. The first chapter is a brief introduction to Caracas and Chacao; it 
provides a description of the area under study and comments on some geographic, social, 
political and economic aspects of the Venezuelan reality that form an important background 
and context for the developments in Caracas and Chacao. Chapter 2 is a review of recent 
literature and research on urban restructuring processes and their relation to new ICTs. The 
idea is to bring together literature on entrepreneurial governance strategies with literature on 
new ICTs and urban form. Chapter 3 describes the empirical data that form the basis for the 
present investigation, and presents the procedures that were used in their recollection. 
Chapter 4 presents and analyses the data and is the central part of the thesis. The chapter is 
divided into three sections dealing with the issues of ICT-networks, the location preferences 
of firms and administrative issues. Chapter 5 presents a conclusion from the analysis in brief. 
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1. Background: Caracas 
Caracas is the capital of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It is the administrative and 
economic center of the country and the location of the administrative and judicial institutions 
of the national government as well as of the headquarters of practically all the major public 
and private companies that operate in the country. Most of the economic activity in Caracas 
is to be found in the finance and service sectors, often related to the oil production which is 
the country’s primary export.  
 The oil boom in the 1920s spurred a rapid and continuous population growth in 
Venezuela’s urban regions as the prospect of oil-related jobs in the cities resulted in a 
massive rural-urban migration that combined with substantial endogenous urban growth, has 
made Venezuela the most urbanized country of Latin America with an urbanization level of 
92% (World Bank 1997). As the capital, Caracas has been particularly affected by this 
development: By 2001, 28 times as many inhabitants lived within the confines of the valley 
of Caracas as in 1920, and that is without taking into consideration what probably amounts 
to hundreds of thousands of unregistered residents, many of which have settled in the 
unregulated slum areas in the unstable hill-sides around the Valley of Caracas (see map 1) 
(Census 2001, Negron 1996, Perna 1981, World Bank 1997).  
 
 
Map 1. Slum areas in the DMC, 1990s. Source: Barrios 2002. 
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1.1 Geographic and administrative limits 
The slim valley within which the city of Caracas is situated stretches 30 km from West to 
East with the historical center situated in the western part. Historically the city has been 
expanding slowly towards the East, following the shape of the Valley of Caracas which by 
now is entirely urbanized apart from the northern hills that belong to the National Reserve of 
the El Avila Mountain. 
 In the course of its rapid growth throughout the 20th century, the urban nucleus of 
Caracas has expanded far beyond its original limits. Depending on the context, the term 
‘Caracas’ is used to denote either the historical city of Caracas that today corresponds with 
the municipality of Libertador; or it is used to denote the conjunction of Libertador and the 
remaining 4 municipalities within the Valley of Caracas that today corresponds with the 
administrative area of the Distrito Metropolitano de Caracas (DMC, Metropolitan District 
of Caracas); or, lastly, it is sometimes used to denote the functionally integrated conjunction 
of the DMC with its 12 surrounding municipalities that form the Metropolitan Region of 
Caracas (RMC, Región Metropolitana de Caracas) (see map 2) (Barrios 2001, Paiva 2002). 
 
Map 2. Municipalities of DMC, RMC. Source: Barrios 2002. 
 
The most common delimitation of ‘Caracas’ today is the DMC – the five municipalities 
within the Valley of Caracas. The DMC encompasses more than 96% of the population of 
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the RMC and the hill sides of the Valley also function as a ‘natural’ delimitation for the city. 
In this thesis the term ‘Caracas’ is used interchangeably with ‘DMC’ unless otherwise 
specified. 
 The institutional framework for the administration of the DMC is complex, bringing 
together local, metropolitan, regional, and central levels of government. The DMC is 
organized as a two-level municipal system of government with the Alcaldía Metropolitana 
(AM, Metropolitan Municipality) encompassing the 5 local municipalities Sucre, Baruta, El 
Hatillo, Chacao, and Libertador. The first four of these municipalities belong to the state of 
Miranda, while the last is the sole municipality of the Distrito Capital (DC, Capital District). 
1.2 Political Tension 
Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías was elected President of Venezuela in 1998 on a program that 
promised a new direction for Venezuelan politics and an end to the neoliberal policies of the 
1990s. The country’s poor majority supported Chávez’ call for social reforms, a new 
constitution and continued state ownership of the national oil company PDVSA. 
A new constitution was in place by 1999, and major changes were undertaken in PDVSA in 
what practically constituted a re-nationalization of the country’s oil-assets that according to 
the government had been under the de facto control of private interests. 
 The traditional elite’s discontent with the changes led to a short lived coup d’etat in 
April 2002 when the President was kidnapped but later reinstated after massive popular 
protest.  
 A few months later, intending to raise public opinion against the President and thus 
forcing him to resign, the political opposition dealt a serious blow to the country’s economy 
by bringing the country’s oil production to a virtual halt for several weeks between 
December 2002 and January 2003. The importance of the oil sector for the Venezuelan 
economy cannot be overestimated and this event spurred an unprecedented social and 
economic crisis that revealed a profound political polarization of Venezuelan society. 
Contrary to the expectations of the opposition the crisis failed to weaken the popular support 
for the Chávez government: in August 2004 a large majority of Venezuelan voters confirmed 
their support for the President and his politics in a national referendum over whether to 
recall the Presidential mandate. The referendum that was held on the request of the 
opposition received the highest turnout in the history of Venezuela.  
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This tense political situation forms an important background for this study which seeks to 
understand the uneven nature of development in Caracas. The political antagonism is 
reflected in the political geography of Caracas in the sense that the different municipal 
administrations are either ‘pro-‘ or ‘anti-Chávez’, with all the implications that brings for 
their will to cooperate with each other and with the central government. In the summer of 
2004 the Mayors of Chacao, Baruta, El Hatillo and the AM were in opposition to the 
government. Shortly after this study was undertaken in the autumn of 2004, Mayors loyal to 
the Chávez government won popular vote in local elections in Libertador and in the AM. 
1.3 Major Characteristics and Developments in the Urban 
Morphology of Caracas  
Caracas’ cityscape is characterized by the enormous contrast between the precarious slum 
dwellings along the hillsides of the valley (see photo 1), and the luxurious villas and high-
tech skyscrapers in the downtown business areas. The economic reform package launched by 
the Pérez government in 1989 spurred a popular uprising in Caracas (The ‘Caracazo’) when 
slum-dwellers poured down from the hill-sides into the wealthy areas in the center. That 
event has left the wealthier segments of society with a fear reflected in Caracas’ extensive 
‘fortress architecture’ of walls and gated communities (see photos 2 and 3) that separate the 
rich from the poor in the slum areas where more than half the urban population resides (WB 
1992). 
 
Photo 1. Hill side slum in Caracas. Photograph: Are Nagoda 
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Photo 2. Guarded entrance to gated community in Caracas. Photograph: 
Are Nagoda. 
 
Photo 3. Electric fence protecting residential area. Photograph: Are 
Nagoda. 
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While most of Caracas is suffering from disinvestment and various degrees of decay there 
are ’islands’ of well kept, and well guarded, wealth: there are the gated communities and the 
private confines of banks and firms scattered across town and especially to the East where 
large areas seem to have avoided the effects of economic recession.  
 Up until the 1970s the city had developed in the form of concentric circles around the 
historical center of Libertador where all the national public institutions and the large private 
enterprises were located. Later, towards the end of the 1970s a gradual saturation of the 
center combined with the opening of a metro line (running West-East) spurred an expansion 
of the center eastwards towards Sabana Grande in the East of Libertador. However 
Libertador soon proved unable to expand the infrastructural capacity of these areas 
sufficiently to sustain the continued growth of the city. The rapid population growth 
increased the demand for public and private services and the increasing intensity of the 
activity in the central areas brought with it serious traffic and security problems. 
 It is in this period, from the end of the 1980s, that Chacao has appeared as a new pole 
of corporate development in Caracas changing the focus of business activity away from 
Libertador and the traditional center.  
 
Map 3. Expansion of the center in the 1960/70s. Chacao is the fourth 
central area from the left. Source: Perna 1981.  
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1.4 Chacao 
Chacao borders to Libertador, to the West; Sucre, to the East; Baruta to the South; and to the 
state of Vargas to the North of the El Avila Mountain (see maps 2 and 4). The municipality 
covers 36 km² out of which only 9 km² are urbanized; the remaining part belongs to the El 
Avila National Park and is uninhabited. The urban territory of Chacao is relatively flat and 
slightly elevated. (Gonzales 1998). 
 
Walking Eastwards from the historical center of Caracas one cannot fail to notice the border 
between Libertador and Chacao. Not only because of the aspect of the buildings that appear 
to be older and more run-down in Libertador, but also because there is much more activity 
on the streets there. Along the Sabana Grande boulevard in Libertador the informal 
commercial activity attracts a lot of people during the daytime transforming the boulevard 
into a market place, and then, where the Sabana Grande Boulevard terminates at Chacaíto, 
all this activity suddenly stops because of the Chacao government’s strict enforcement of a 
local ban on informal commerce. In Chacao the major shopping areas are to be found within 
the private confines of its 7 shopping malls, which include Latin America’s largest (Sambil). 
Approaching Chacao by car, the municipal border is perhaps even more striking as one is 
welcomed by large road signs carrying the municipal logo, saying “You are now in Safe 
Territory.” 
 
Photo 4. “You are now in Safe Territory”. Photograph: Are Nagoda 
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Higher standard of built environment in Chacao  
The built environment in Chacao does not echo the somewhat deteriorated state of most of 
the city. While there are areas that are well maintained in all of the municipalities, this is true 
for the entire municipality of Chacao. Chacao has got only an insignificant number of slum-
dwellers, according to the national census of 2001 a total of 39 people. The residential areas 
of Chacao, located mostly to the North are characterized by low-rise apartment buildings, 
villas and the occasional mansion; in the downtown area of Chacao, the many high-rise 
buildings with their shiny glass walls create a big-city atmosphere worthy of a modern 
metropolis (see photo 5). 
There are few public green areas in Chacao 
apart from the mountainous national park to 
the North. However Chacao borders to a 
large park to the East (Parque Del Este) in 
the municipality Sucre, and Chacao also 
has a large private green area with a golf 
course (Urbanización Country Club). 
 
In recent years Chacao has proven to be a 
more attractive office location than any 
other area in the city.  While before, almost 
all the high-rise buildings associated with 
the producer-service and finance sectors 
were to be found in the central business 
district (CBD) located near the buildings of 
the national government in the historical 
center, there has been a remarkable increase in business activity in two areas to the East of 
the historical center during the last decade and most intensely between 1997 and 2000 (FVI 
2003, Sociologist at Penthouse). The most important of these new areas has been called 
Caracas’ ‘Emerging Financial Center’ or Caracas’ new CBD. It has the following 
geographic boundaries (see map 4): to the West, Chacaíto; to the East, Los Palos Grandes; to 
the North, La Castellana, Altamira, and Los Palos Grandes; to the South, El Rosal (FVI 
2003). In other words the area is placed firmly within the municipality of Chacao. The other 
area which has also seen a notable although inferior increase in business activity in recent 
Photo 5.  Skyscrapers in Chacao. 
Photograph: Are Nagoda 
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years is located to the South of Chacao in the municipality of Baruta. The focus of this study 
is on the development in Chacao which has been much more dramatic. 
 
 
Map 4. Emerging CBD in Chacao. Source: Based on www.chacao.gov.ve 
and FVI 2003. 
Prestigious high-rise buildings with company logos have been popping up like mushrooms 
in Chacao while similar buildings in the historical center have been abandoned. Chacao has 
only got 65 000 inhabitants (less than 2.35% of the population of the DMC), and with an 
extension of only 5% of the city area Chacao is the smallest of the five municipalities that 
make up the Metropolitan District of Caracas, yet approximately 55% of the office real 
estate activity of Caracas is produced in Chacao (INE 2001, President of Chacón & 
Associates). 
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1.5 The Great Change  
As mentioned the Pérez government initiated a far-reaching economic and political reform 
program in 1989. This market-oriented reform program, called El Gran Virage (The Great 
Change), received ample support from World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in the form of policy advice and a total of $6.7 billion in loans. It was aimed at 
reducing government intervention, liberalizing the economy, the privatization of public 
enterprises including the national telecommunications company CANTV, and the political 
decentralization of government functions (World Bank 1992). These reforms have had a 
great impact on recent developments in Caracas and as such they provide an important 
context for this study of the agglomeration in Chacao. In the following I will consider how 
the liberalization and decentralization efforts of The Great Change may have contributed to 
Chacao’s strengthened position within the DMC. 
 
Deindustrialization and growth in the service sector 
Caracas has never been a very significant industrial city with only 18% of its population 
employed in industry in 1989 and since the Great Change the city has experienced 
significant deindustrialization. Between 1989 and 1997 there was a direct loss of over 45 
thousand jobs in the industrial sector in the DMC. This deindustrialization cannot be 
understood as a relocation of industry to the metropolitan periphery as has been observed in 
other large cities, in fact the RMC as a whole experienced a direct loss of over 52 thousand 
jobs over the same period. The deindustrialization accentuates the growing importance of the 
service sector in the city’s economy. In 1997 78.3% of formal employment in Caracas was to 
be found in the service sector, up from 73.4% in 1989. Within the service sector, it is the 
share of jobs in the upper range services like real estate finance, insurance, and other 
producer services that has increased the most. In 1997 Caracas was the location of almost 
half of the national employment in this sub-sector (Barrios 2001). 
 The deindustrialization and the increasing importance of the service sector affects the 
city in a geographically biased way as employment in the service sector is associated with 
the central areas of the city while the jobs in industry are usually found in more peripherical 
areas. In Caracas this bias is particularly articulated when it comes to upper range, producer 
services and the growth of employment in that sub-sector is likely to benefit the financial 
districts in Libertador and Chacao almost exclusively. 
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The real estate market and Chacao 
The implementation of the reform program involved reducing the government’s role in the 
economy by eliminating housing programs and development funds, and by privatizing or 
liquidating public banks. Also, the interest rates and the rules regulating the allocation of 
credits and foreign ownership were liberalized. These liberalization efforts are thought to 
have greatly strengthened the private real estate and finance sectors of the economy. 
Certainly in Caracas a great number of new buildings were constructed at the beginning of 
the 1990s and especially towards the East in Chacao where there was attractive land 
available for office development. 
 At the same time the opening-up of the economy allowed many foreign companies to 
establish themselves in Venezuela. In the important petroleum sector alone 10 new 
companies, among others Shell, British Petroleum and Statoil, set up headquarters in 
Caracas in the beginning of the 1990s. These new companies required a large quantity of 
offices of a high standard, and that real-estate was available in Chacao. Later, and also as a 
consequence of the increased economic openness, a lot of foreign-owned franchise chains 
established in Caracas and these enterprises also preferred to locate towards the East where 
the purchasing power and potential demand was higher.  
 This building-boom was brought to an end as political instability brought on a 
financial crisis in 1994. The banks that had been financing the extensive real-estate 
developments suffered an acute liquidity crisis and could not come to terms with their 
obligations. A great deal of the lost values, estimated to some 20% of GDP or around 20 
billion $US, were represented in the mass of newly constructed office buildings. Chacao was 
particularly affected by this because much of this corporate real estate was situated in that 
municipality, and following 1994 the owners, often banks, were forced to sell it en masse. 
This meant that a few large investors were able to buy a significant amount of office 
buildings at the price of construction, creating a new situation in the real-estate market – a 
high number of offices on few hands made office space available for letting, while new 
construction came to a halt because the construction and finance sectors feared the 
reoccurrence of a crisis situation.  
A demand and a stable price level, for office space has been maintained in Chacao partly 
because the availability of let office space has made the entry costs lower for firms wishing 
to establish in first class offices in the municipality. While much of the city is characterized 
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by economic recession, the relative stability in Chacao is also understood to make it a 
relatively safe area to invest in. 
 
The Decentralization 
The administrative situation in Caracas of today was put into effect with the Ley Especial 
sobre el Régimen del Distrito Metropolitano de Caracas (LEDMC, Special Law for the 
Government of the Metropolitan District of Caracas) of March 2000 which is based on the 
new Venezuelan constitution of 1999. However the current administrative situation is 
fundamentally characterized by the major changes brought about with the reform program of 
1989. This program included drastic measures not only towards economic liberalization but 
also towards political decentralization, and with the Ley Orgánica de Régimen Municipal 
(LORM, Organic Law for Municipal Government) of June 1989 a process of administrative 
fragmentation and decentralization was implemented in Caracas. Significantly the LORM 
conceded the municipalities a much greater degree of budgetary independence and 
responsibility, and it also simplified the procedure for creating new municipalities. 
 In Caracas the law had almost immediate consequences for the administrative 
division. By the early 1990s the district of Sucre, belonging to the State of Miranda and 
forming part of what was then called the Area Metropolitana de Caracas (AMC, 
Metropolitan Area of Caracas) and today is called the DMC, had been replaced by the 4 
municipalities Sucre, Baruta, El Hatillo, and Chacao. Chacao’s history as a municipality then 
is very short. It was a parish of the municipality of Sucre until November 13th 1991 when 
the state of Miranda approved a law that provided Chacao with status of an autonomous 
municipality. The promulgation of this law followed an application issued by a local interest 
group (Junta Promotora). According to the LORM of 1989 any self sustained community of 
more than 10.000 registered voters may be granted municipal status if such a request is 
issued with the support of a minimum of 20% of the registered voters in the area. The final 
decision on whether to create the new municipality is taken by the legal assembly of the state 
to which the municipality belongs. 
 
Fragmentation and socioeconomic differences  
Although the administrative division in Caracas is relatively new, it is striking how well 
defined the municipal borders are by the visible evidence of socio-economic differences 
between Eastern and Western Caracas. To understand the uneven development in Caracas it 
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is necessary to explore the relationship between the administrative division and the socio-
economic differences in the city. This question is relevant to the topic of this thesis because 
there seems to be a connection between Chacao’s relative prosperity and the agglomeration 
of enterprises in Chacao, and the territorial differences in Caracas, especially between the 
municipalities of Libertador and Chacao, do seem to have intensified over the years. 
 Historically Chacao developed as a wealthy suburb to central Caracas. According to 
a Sociologist at Penthouse, a real estate consultancy in Caracas, the development of the 
territory as a residential area began in the 1950s – the flat, slightly elevated and cooler areas 
of the Chacao plain provided an ideal residential location for the richer segments of society 
in Caracas that wanted to live away from the increasingly noisy and poverty ridden 
downtown. The development towards the East also coincides with the construction of 
Caracas’ first two highways that run from the center eastwards, connecting the wealthy 
suburbs with the center. In the Sociologist’s opinion this shows how, “the movements of the 
higher income groups are determinant for the development of cities. They attract towards 
their location the investments in infrastructure.” Which is what happened from the 1970s on 
in Chacao: “The people with higher salaries had moved Eastward before, to not mix with the 
poor and the companies moved after.” 
 
Therefore, in 1991 when the residents of the parish of Chacao achieved independence and 
the municipality of Chacao was formed, much wealth was already concentrated within its 
modest boundaries. Commenting this origin of Chacao, an Architect at the Oficina Local de 
Planeamiento Urbano (OLPU, Local Office for Urban Planning in the Municipality of 
Chacao) says that, “The division might seem somewhat unjust as Chacao was the area of 
Sucre with most of the valuable business and with little poverty.” 
 While this situation secured Chacao a good start, it is unlikely to have been beneficial 
to the rest of the city. In Liberator’s Office for Strategic Urban Development it is 
commented that the creation of Chacao accentuated the uneven development in Caracas: 
“When Chacao was a part of the district of Sucre there was not much distinction, regarding 
the incomes, logically, they were the district’s. When they divided, the tenderloin was just 
there [in Chacao].  In fact, after the partitioning almost half of the tax income of what used 
to be Sucre remained with Chacao with only one-tenth of the population (Gonzales 1998). 
 The municipal authorities of both Chacao and Libertador praise the fragmentation 
and decentralization process’ intention of bringing the authorities closer to the people 
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through the creation of smaller administrative entities along with the delegation of more 
authority to the local level and Chacao is considered the prime success story of this kind of 
new local government.  
 Yet the case of Chacao also exemplifies how the principal instrument for 
decentralization, the Organic Law of Municipal Regime (LORM) of 1989, makes it not only 
possible but economically beneficial for richer areas to segregate – increasing the risk of 
having new administrative borders drawn according to socio-economic criteria. The LORM 
leaves the municipalities with greater autonomy with respect to income generation (article 
10) and correspondingly also delegates more responsibilities to the municipal level. 
Significantly, article 36, makes the provision of even basic services and infrastructures a 
local, municipal responsibility. Article 38 further specifies that municipalities with more 
than 50,000 inhabitants will have the functional responsibility for public lighting, 
cemeteries, solid waste management, water and sewerage, slaughter house, public markets, 
primary health care, public park maintenance, libraries, urban planning, street signs, civil 
protection, daycare and pensions, family planning, fire-fighting and public sport facilities. It 
is clear that with the existence of significant territorial inequalities, wealthy areas are likely 
to benefit from autonomy because the wealth that is generated on a municipality’s territory 
will benefit that municipality almost exclusively.  
 This means that the administrative fragmentation in Caracas greatly reduces 
territorial cross-subsidizing. Given the parallel decentralization of the public services to a 
municipal level, increasing differences in the territorially determined income bases of the 
municipalities are bound to contribute to an aggravation of the uneven developments 
observed within the DMC. For the parish of Chacao municipal status means that the 
significant tax-contribution that the relatively high density of offices on its territory 
represents can be spent according to the decisions of it own municipal administration.  
 
Inequality within the DMC  
Municipal revenues are very unevenly distributed within the DMC (see figure 1). The 
growth in Chacao is in stark contrast with the significant economic difficulties that Caracas 
as a whole is experiencing – on a prestigious ranking list published annually by the 
magazine AméricaEconomía, Caracas ended up as number 35 out of 40 Latin American 
cities ranked by economic attractiveness in 2004 (Calvo et al. 2004). 
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Figure 1. Per capita revenue in the municipalities of the DMC 1997. Source: 
Mitchell 1998. 
 
The economic disparities between the municipalities of the DMC regarding municipal 
income are shown in Figure 1. The striking contrast between Chacao and the rest of the 
municipalities is especially problematic because there is much poverty in the city, and 
further polarization is likely. The deterioration currently observed in many parts of the city, 
and especially in Libertador, can be understood as a ‘malevolent spiral’ that parallels the 
positive development in Chacao in the sense that most of the businesses that move to Chacao 
have a previous location in another part of the city, most often Libertador, and they bring 
their contribution to the municipal income with them. An Architect at the OLPU even 
considers the deterioration of Libertador in itself to be a significant push-factor for 
companies that are considering reestablishing in Chacao (President of Chacón & 
Associates). 
 The income and employment the companies bring are important, and some of the 
municipalities are willing to go far to retain and/or attract them. A Sociologist with the real 
estate consultancy Penthouse comments that when “Libertador is lowering the real-estate 
taxes to keep the investments there, while they should go up as the inflation is strong… [this] 
should be interpreted as an indication of how bad things are going there.”  The President of 
Miguel Chacón & Associates says about the use of financial incentives that, “Baruta is even 
more aggressive usually, than Chacao is; because Chacao has it easier as it’s more 
consolidated. […] If you install your company there, they will negotiate a non-payment of 
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taxes for I don’t know how many years. A thousand and one incentives.” These quotes might 
also indicate that the strengthened intra-urban competition has led to a sort of ‘race to the 
bottom’ policies at municipal level. There is no room for any comparison of municipal 
policies here, but intra-urban competition for private investments is definitely significant. 
1.6 Metropolitan Administration  
To bring the development within the DMC into harmony the 1999 constitution included 
provisions for the creation of a common administrative entity for all the 5 municipalities of 
the Metropolitan District of Caracas. It was argued that an administrative authority was 
needed that could coordinate the management of the DMC that since the early 1990s had 
involved 5 municipal governments, 2 regional governments and the various public and 
private enterprises taking care of the provision of services in the DMC. 
 According to a prominent Professor of Architecture at UCV, it was a fundamental 
problem for Caracas that it had, 
“lost the one organ that could maintain a vision of the metropolis as whole. 
When the politics of decentralization was beginning to be put into practice 
[…] one of the very first decisions was to eliminate the Metropolitan Office 
for Urban Planning (OMPU), and they didn’t put anything in its place.” 
The various municipal governments soon realized that some of the tasks that had become 
their responsibilities with the decentralization needed to be approached on a larger scale than 
that of their local jurisdictions, and throughout the 1990s there were various attempts at 
institutionalizing some kind of governing authority at a metropolitan level (Paiva 2002). 
 Finally, when a new national constitution was under way in 1999, the administrative 
challenges facing Caracas as a metropolis were discussed in the constitutional assembly and 
a law was passed with the intention of mending the negative consequences of the 
administrative fragmentation and decentralization. The resulting Special Law Concerning 
the Metropolitan District of Caracas (LEDMC) stipulated the creation of the Alcaldía 
Metropolitana (AM, Metropolitan Government) that should ensure a more coherent 
confrontation of common problems and a more efficient provision of services. Among the 
central goals of the new Metropolitan Government’s Secretary for Urban Planning is the 
harmonic development of the city (AM 2001, Delfino 2001). 
 According to the Director of the Department for Urban Planning at the AM, much of 
the problematic development in Caracas in the 1990s had its roots in the administrative 
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fragmentation and decentralization process: “The smaller municipal governments can 
exercise their public function closer to the citizen [and] there are more possibilities to 
discuss and influence the budgets, [but] it harms the coordination,” and “especially in terms 
of the provision of networked services. That’s why the Metropolitan Government is 
necessary.”  The Director of the Department of Urban Planning points out that part of the 
reason for the displacement of business from the historical center and Eastwards towards 
Chacao during the middle of 1990s is to be found in the insufficient coordination of security 
and transport that contributed to the deterioration of public space across the city: 
“Because of this, Chacao gathers strength. Because Chacao has the main vial 
corridors, Libertador Avenue, the Boyacá express way; it has four metro 
stations within reach. […] It’s flat. It has a number of geographic 
characteristics of accessibility, of investments in quality infrastructure.” And, 
“the companies are looking for the safest zone, which is Chacao.” The result 
is that, “Chacao grows on the cost of not only Libertador but of the 
deterioration of the whole city […].” 
The AM, then, is intended to provide some sort of super-municipal coordination to counter-
arrest the uneven development of the DMC. To this respect the LEDMC attributes the AM 
with such tasks as urban planning, urban road infrastructure, police, public health and solid 
waste disposal. The LEDMC, article 22, also establishes that the AM is to be financed with 
10% of the money the central government transfers to the states that are a part of the DMC, 
and with a significant 10% of the income of the municipalities that make up the DMC (Paiva 
2002). 
 With these steps towards a redistribution of service responsibilities and revenue, the 
LEDMC could seem capable of neutralizing at least some of the polarizing effects the 
fragmentation and decentralization process has had on the DMC. Various critics have 
commented however that the creation of the AM has brought very little if any improvement 
to the administrative situation in Caracas. There are several reasons for this. According to 
the interviewed Professor of Architecture at the UCV, a big part of the problem is that the 
LEDMC “doesn’t clarify sufficiently the competences of the AM in relation to the municipal 
governments.”  Indeed, all of the tasks the LEDMC attributed to the AM that were 
mentioned above, coincide with tasks that are assigned to the different municipalities 
according to the LORM (1989). This situation is confusing and makes it hard for the AM to 
retain its legitimacy which in turn makes it hard to make the municipalities pay their share of 
the AM’s budget (Paiva 2002).  
 19
 Another important reason for the AM’s lack of success is the highly conflictive 
political situation in Caracas and Venezuela. At the time this research was undertaken the 
AM was led by a Mayor in opposition to the central government, and the Metropolitan 
Police forces under his control were allegedly involved in the short lived April 2002 coop 
d’etat against the sitting President of the Republic, Hugo Chávez. 
 This tense situation has consequences for the inter-municipal cooperation and for the 
financial situation of the AM which relies on contributions from the different states and 
municipalities of the DMC, with their different political affiliations. According to the 
Professor of Architecture at the UCV, “the government isn’t conceding the resources that 
they should to the municipalities of the opposition. The mayors loyal to the government and 
those that are with the opposition don’t meet.” The Director of the department of Urban 
Planning confirms: “Theoretically and legally, cooperation between the municipalities 
should be possible. There is the Consejo Metropolitano de Alcaldes [Metropolitan Council 
of Mayors], where all the Mayors should meet, but they don’t – because of the political 
situation.” 
 On the other hand, the municipalities that sympathize with the national government 
complain that the AM is not providing them with the services that it should. The Mayor of 
Libertador, Freddy Bernal, for example, argues that the 11 thousand officers of the 
Metropolitan Police fail their obligation to aid the 11 hundred municipal police officers in 
Libertador with the very serious problems of crime in that municipality (Últimas Noticias 
2004/6/22). The Professor of Architecture asserts that “We have reached a situation where 
the new law has made the city not more but rather less governable than before.”  
 
The AM has not lived up to expectations. In part because its competences are limited and ill-
defined; but the politically tense situation in Caracas has also exposed the vulnerability of its 
financial base. 
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2. Theoretical perspectives 
The literature on contemporary urban restructuring processes is extensive and in the 
following I will present only a selection of the contributions that I find most relevant for this 
study. Much of this literature suggests that similar processes of change are taking place in 
urban areas across the world, and reviewing some of what has already been written may also 
contribute to a better understanding of the changes in the urban structure of Caracas. 
 In what follows I will give a brief outline of the debates on the relationship between 
recent transformations in the world economy and the political economy of cities – what are 
the city level responses to such related issues as, the introduction of new information and 
communication technologies (ICTs); the increasing importance of transnational companies 
(TNCs) in national and urban economies; the calls for economic liberalization; and the 
increasing focus on local competitiveness? In my review of this diverse literature I will try to 
bring together the literature on entrepreneurial governance strategies with the literature on 
new ICTs, always with a focus on issues of uneven development and socio-territorial 
polarization. 
2.1 The world economy transformed: Post-Fordism 
Most scholars agree that the world economy has gone through a process of change since the 
1970s so profound that it can be said to have resulted in a new economic system. This 
change has variously been labeled a shift from the Keynesian State to the Competitive State 
(Kim & Short 1999); a shift from Fordism to post- or after-Fordism (Gertler 2000); a shift 
from modernism to postmodernism; or the emergence of a new Kondratiev ‘long wave’ of 
economic development (Graham & Marvin 2001). Irrespective of the label that is used to 
denote it however there is a common understanding that the change involves a ‘deregulation’ 
of the economy and the introduction of more flexibility in the production process. Within the 
political economic perspective the regulation school talks of a shift from a Fordist to a post-
Fordist ‘regime of accumulation’ where the term ‘regime of accumulation’ refers to the 
dominant form and organization of capitalist production. This regime change can be 
understood as a response to the economic downturn, or crisis, following the post war boom. 
From this perspective, the post-Fordist regime of accumulation is a reaction to the falling 
rates of profit. In order to improve the rates of profits the new regime of accumulation 
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introduces a more flexible relationship between labor and capital that leaves capital with 
greater control over the deployment of labor through such practices as subcontracting, 
greater vertical integration between firms, and a more flexible use of labor (Short 1996). The 
post-Fordist regime of accumulation is characterized by neoliberal political discourses that 
promote a “belief in the social and economic efficiency of the ‘free’ market and 
competitiveness” (Leitner & Sheppard 1998, 285). 
 This economic and political restructuring, together with advances within the 
information and communications technologies (ICTs), has intensified the competition 
between cities as sites of production. The increasing geographic mobility of firms that 
employ new forms of technology and flexible production means that city governments are 
faced with increasing economic uncertainty while at the same time they are met with the 
opportunities offered by business-friendly policies that promise to attract firms and 
investments. The rise of so called ‘entrepreneurial policies’ where local governments 
actively encourage economic development by promoting the involvement of private 
investors on their territory is therefore often associated with the importance of 
competitiveness under post-Fordism. According to Leitner and Sheppard (1998, 296) “urban 
entrepreneurialism and inter urban competition are so closely associated with one another 
that frequently they are treated as synonymous.” 
 Hall & Hubbard (1998) argue that the broader shift in the capitalist economy, i.e. 
from a Fordist to a post-Fordist regime of accumulation, is inseparable from the tendency in 
urban governance towards entrepreneurialism. As they see it, most theorizations of such a 
tendency are rooted in a political economy approach where it is assumed that the aim of state 
intervention is to ensure the reproduction of the economy and society. A change in urban 
governance means a change in the way local tensions between capital and labor are resolved, 
and, as mentioned above, this relationship between capital and labor forms part of the very 
definition of ‘regime of accumulation’. In this sense urban entrepreneurialism can be said to 
be the urban governance strategy of post-Fordism.  
2.1.1 Entrepreneurial governance 
Entrepreneurial strategies of urban governance are often contrasted with the so-called 
‘managerial’ strategies of previous decades where the role of local government was 
primarily that of manager and provider of services. Entrepreneurial governance strategies on 
the other hand are often characterized by their focus on economic competitiveness and an 
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orientation towards growth, especially through the encouragement of private partnerships 
and investments (Harvey 1989, Hubbard & Hall 1998, Kim & Short 1999).  
 This focus on private and semi-private actors within entrepreneurial regimes is often 
described as a shift from urban ‘government’ to urban ‘governance’ (i.e. Hall & Hubbard 
1998). The term ‘governance’ is then being used in a new way that distinguishes it from the 
term ‘government’ precisely to put an emphasis on the plurality of actors involved in the 
production of policy outcomes and the diminished role of the state in that production. 
Whereas ‘governance’ traditionally has been defined as ‘the act of governing’ and thus as 
synonymous to the term ‘government’, recent academic usage strips ‘governance’ of much 
of the hierarchical connotations associated with ‘government’ and defines it rather as the 
coordination of institutions, organizations and other actors in the production of policy 
outcome (Painter 2000).  
 Leitner and Sheppard (1998) suggest that among the broader trends that have 
encouraged the adoption of such strategies are the tendency for national states to spend less 
on welfare state activities; the emphasis on decentralizing powers and responsibilities from 
national to sub national levels of government; and the erosion of nation states’ power to 
control and manage their own economies as a result of an increasing influence of 
supranational institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. These trends have affected central-local 
government relations and made it both possible and necessary for local government to look 
for new ways of dealing with economic uncertainty. The increasing involvement of private 
actors in urban governance is therefore not only ideologically grounded (in neoliberal 
theory); it is also a response to a tightening of local state budgets. From the perspective of 
regime theory, public-private partnerships in urban areas arise out of necessity as a means to 
enable the regime to carry out its governing functions. Cooperation with the private sector 
allows public officials with limited resources at their disposal to “produce the capacity to 
govern” (Hall & Hubbard 1998, 10).  
 According to Harvey (1989) urban entrepreneurial governance strategies are 
employed by cities to lure production, financial and consumption flows into its space. 
Development, then, is driven by purely speculative investments instead of comprehensive 
planning. Such speculative investments may be successful, but they may also fail to deal 
with the “serious social and economic problems [that] are taking geographic shape in the 
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form of a dual city of inner city regeneration and a surrounding sea of increasing 
impoverishment” (Harvey 1989, 16). 
 Harvey argues further that urban entrepreneurialism and competition is likely to 
bring with it a polarizing tendency of upward and downward spirals of urban growth 
because inter-urban competition for a limited amount of resources, capital and jobs amount 
to a zero-sum game that is bound to produce winners and losers. If one locality successfully 
manages to lure investments into its space, there will also be another locality that fails to do 
the same, and this development may be self-reinforcing as a successful location is likely to 
become more attractive and maintain its success. He writes that this competition between 
localities has been intensified by new ICT infrastructures (1989, 11), and before I bring the 
consideration of these matters further I will look at this and other possible spatial 
implications of these new ICTs in the next section.  
 
In the literature on entrepreneurial governance strategies, such strategies are almost always 
considered on an inter-urban scale, as in the example above where it is suggested that in the 
zero-sum game of attracting investments, entrepreneurial strategies produce inequalities 
between cities. Does this mean that such policies, when employed at a municipal level within 
a city are likely to produce intra-urban inequalities? What is the role of entrepreneurial 
governance strategies in the uneven development of the geography of Caracas? 
2.1.2 Changing infrastructural scenarios 
The world economy is a system made up of local, regional and national activities that are all 
tied together through a variety of infrastructures for transport and communication. Major 
infrastructural changes are therefore bound to affect that economic system, the relation 
between global and local processes, and their corresponding geographies.  
 There is no doubt that the introduction of new ICTs and the infrastructures that 
support them constitute such a major infrastructural change. Developments in the ICTs have 
brought new possibilities for the organization of the production process and the economy. 
Companies around the world make use of electronic networks in their day-to-day operations 
and the ICTs have become fundamental in the world economy – the companies that operate 
on a global scale require real-time communication and information access that would be 
unthinkable just a few of decades ago. Everything from the synchronization and control of 
vast production networks to international financial transactions depends on increasingly 
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advanced information infrastructure. In fact, many of the characteristics of the post-Fordist 
economy and society, like the intensity of competition and the more flexible production, are 
closely related to the possibilities for economic and social organization this new 
infrastructure has brought.  
 To understand the changing geographies of cities in the post-Fordist era it is therefore 
necessary to understand the geographic implications of these socio-technical changes. 
Infrastructure can be defined simply as the underlying, usually immobile, structure of 
services and amenities necessary for productive activity (Lee 2000). For a better 
understanding of what infrastructure is and does however the political-economy perspective 
provides an insightful account. 
The political economy of infrastructure 
Political-economy perspectives are founded on relational theory where time, space and place 
have no essential, fixed meaning. Instead, time, space and place are the outcomes of 
spatialised social relations. The relational links within and between cities are multiple and 
complex and geographic proximity is certainly no guarantee for meaningful relations or 
connections. Given the intricate configurations of modern infrastructure networks it would 
be naïve to think simply that geographically far-off places and persons do not relate while 
close-up ones do. Access to local and global networked infrastructures that mediate the 
relational links between and within cities are all-important for people’s and capital’s varying 
ability to overcome these constraints. While capitalism’s goal of perfect mobility for labor, 
goods, capital, information, water and energy is strictly theoretical, infrastructural networks 
do possess a varying ability to increase mobility by compressing time-space barriers. From 
this perspective infrastructure becomes vital for the operation and participation in markets 
and access is therefore fundamental for the exercise of social power and for capital 
accumulation. Accordingly the economic actors’ relative access to infrastructure both 
reflects and reproduces their socio-economic position in society (Graham 2001, Harvey 
2001, Swyngedouw in Graham 2001).  
 The before mentioned centrality of new ICTs for the post-Fordist regime of 
accumulation makes this all-important role of infrastructure clearer than ever before. On a 
global scale the economic system is becoming increasingly geographically dispersed, but at 
the same time the geographically dispersed sites of production, consumption and exchange 
need to be integrated and coordinated to support the processes of production, consumption 
and social and spatial reproduction. The ICTs are central to post-Fordism also because, to 
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the degree they contribute to the compression of spatial barriers to trade and production, 
ICTs are likely to intensify the competition between places and reinforce the use of 
entrepreneurial policies.  
Post-Fordist infrastructural scenarios 
Graham and Marvin (2001) argue that the end of the modern era, what I have been calling 
the shift towards post-Fordism, has brought with it dramatic changes in the provision of 
networked infrastructures. They argue that since the end of the 19th. Century and up until 
the end of the 1960s, urban planning in the West was dominated by an ideal with particular 
implications for urban infrastructure provision. This modern ideal saw the city as a single 
objective entity bound together by the infrastructure networks necessary to sustain its 
population density. The modern urban planner pictured the city as a rationally planned, 
coherent space. Ideally, infrastructure should be supplied universally by the state to all 
citizens. The state’s position as sole provider was legitimized by networked infrastructures’ 
perceived status as a natural monopolies – because of the enormous sunk costs involved in 
the construction of such networks competition in this sector was not considered to be neither 
rational nor possible, and usually only the state would have the means and will to invest in 
such long-term projects. Later, the universal infrastructural access that the modern ideal 
promotes would be further legitimized by the way such access facilitates mass consumption, 
in the so-called Fordist era.  
 The modern ideal has not always matched reality however. Often, and especially in 
the South, the state has failed to provide the population with sufficient infrastructure and this 
has left many in doubt about whether the state should be trusted with this task after all and 
some have even questioned whether universal access should be a goal at all.  
 Undoubtedly the modern ideal of the rationally planned city has lost ground. The rise 
of entrepreneurial governance strategies, discussed above, is an indication of this, and in 
accordance with that discussion it is commonly suggested that the private provision of 
infrastructured services abiding only the laws of profit would at least mean an improvement 
from today’s situation. Harvey (2001) counters that suggestion with the observation that it 
was exactly the excessive market-orientation of the ‘rational’ state-planning that caused its 
failure in the first place. 
 
No matter what the causes of its failure have been, there can be no doubt that the modern 
ideal is facing some serious challenges as neoliberal discourses promoting trade 
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liberalization and competition through the ‘free’ market have become hegemonic in most 
parts of the world. For many countries that are managing with increasingly strained budgets, 
the sale of infrastructural assets represents a welcome albeit short-term income. This is 
especially notable in developing countries that often suffer severe debt-burdens and 
therefore are made subject to the policy recommendations of international financial 
institutions like the World Bank or the IMF. These institutions typically recommend policies 
of privatization and/or fiscal restraints which might further undermine the governments’ 
possibilities of providing sufficient infrastructural services (Graham & Marvin, 2001). 
 
The result of these challenges to the modern ideal has in many cases been an end to the 
state’s status as monopoly provider of infrastructure. As mentioned, infrastructure was 
thought of as a ‘natural’ monopoly because of the perceived irrationality of competing in a 
sector involving such large sunk costs. The monopoly situation in turn suggested a ‘bundled’ 
infrastructure where the different services were provided as one standardized ‘package’ in a 
network geared to providing an entire geographic territory with broadly equal services at 
broadly equal costs. The perceived state failure in planning, the general shift towards a 
neoliberal climate promoting privatization and ‘free’ competition in all sectors, together with 
technological advances that make customized networks possible, has not only brought an 
end to many state monopolies, it has also led to an unbundling of the infrastructure 
networks. By ‘unbundling’ is meant the technical and institutional segmentation of bundled 
infrastructure. This is what happens, for instance, when a government or monopoly owner 
chooses to extend or limit parts of the network to certain areas, or hand over the 
responsibility for parts of what was once one network to private enterprises. For example the 
responsibility for the electrical network may be handed over to one actor while another will 
have the rights to the telephony-network – the electricity and the telephony would then be 
considered unbundled networked services. The result will be a plurality of networks that 
may or may not overlap. Unbundling of an infrastructural network lowers the entry costs for 
investors in the sector and makes it possible to invest in or buy only a part of what was long 
considered ‘naturally’ coherent entities. In other words it makes competition in the sector 
more likely, as it undermines the conception of these networks as natural monopolies. In this 
way unbundling is a means to facilitate the privatization and liberalization of networked 
services. Unbundling also makes infrastructural consumerism possible in the sense that a 
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consumer may pay only for the services he/she uses, or put differently – use only the 
services he/she can pay for (Graham & Marvin, 2001). 
 In the context of a post-Fordist economy where flexibility requirements are higher, 
unbundling plays an important role. Unbundled infrastructure networks make it possible for 
a company to subscribe to networked services according to its changing needs. While the 
Fordist production regimes associated with modernity saw provision of universal access to 
infrastructured services as the basis and goal for a society of mass-consumption, today’s 
post-Fordist, flexible production regimes requires customized and exclusive infrastructures. 
In the South, foreign investors’ demands on infrastructure are often much higher than the 
local standard, and places that can offer exclusive infrastructure networks especially suited 
to the needs of foreign capital possess an important advantage in the competition for 
international investments. The unbundling of networked services increase the likelihood of 
sectorial prosperity in a city that may otherwise be in decline as much economic activity is 
becoming more reliant on access to ICT-networks – to what Castells (Borja & Castells 1997) 
calls the ‘space of flows’ – than on the ‘space of places’, the physical surroundings in the 
geographic proximity.  
 
Later I will consider, in what sense Caracas can be said to be affected by these new 
infrastructural scenarios through a closer look at the ICT networks in the city. What role do 
they have for the evolving geography of Caracas? In what sense has an unbundling of the 
infrastructural networks been taking place and what is the relationship between such 
unbundling and the evolving geography of Caracas? In what follows I will review some 
theoretical approaches to the relationship between technological developments and urban 
form in the context of a changing society. 
2.2 Socio-technical changes and consequences for urban 
geographies 
There seems to be a growing concern within the literature on issues of urban geography both 
with new forms of urban governance and with the rapid advances in the ICTs. While most 
urban theorists seem to agree that both these matters merit attention, there is much 
discrepancy on the respective importance that are attributed to them, and technological 
determinist views have a tendency to overlook the political-economic aspects of the 
dynamics of urban geographies.  
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 The literature on ICTs and urban form may be roughly divided into two theoretical 
traditions – the deconcentration school, and the restructuring school. Within the first, new 
ICTs are considered the last in a historical series of innovations in transportation and 
communications that work rather unidirectionally to free society from place and distance 
constraints. Within the second, spatial restructuring is seen as a result of a mutual relation 
between ICTs and the political economy (i.e. the accumulation and distribution of wealth) of 
cities (Audirac 2002). 
 While the decentralization school may be accused of a sort of technological 
determinism, it presents some strong views on the topic of the relationships between ICTs 
and urban form that are relevant for this thesis, and in the following section I will look at 
what insights that school has to offer before these are contrasted to some of the contributions 
from the restructuring school. This latter school’s concern with the interaction between ICTs 
and the political economy in the restructuring of urban space allows it to show both how 
ICTs have facilitated the rise of entrepreneurial regimes as well as how those entrepreneurial 
regimes shape the outcome of that restructuring (Audirac 2002). 
2.2.1 The decentralization school 
The deconcentration school understands ICTs to more or less dissolve the importance of 
proximity for economic activity. These theories are clearly rooted in neoclassical economics 
and the locational preferences of firms and people (consumers) are to a large degree 
considered an issue of rational choice and cost-efficiency. The new possibilities for 
communication offered by ICTs are believed to have clear implications for the firms’ 
decisions regarding location. Simply stated it is suggested that a (re)location to less central 
areas is likely because of lower m² costs. This decentralizing effect of ICT then, is related to 
the way the concept of accessibility has been altered as new ICT-infrastructures provide a 
kind of ‘virtual’ accessibility that along with traditional notions of physical accessibility 
(distance and mobility) make up what has been called ‘hybrid’ space. Some authors have 
gone as far as to suggest that the introduction of new ICTs will bring about the ‘death of 
distance’ – that location will be irrelevant for companies because the cost of electronic 
communication is not determined by distance. This argument has also led to a parallel 
prediction of the ‘end of cities’ heralding the definite end of agglomeration economies: the 
computerized workplace can be located anywhere (Sassen 1994, Cairncross 1997). 
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 Other more moderate authors within the deconcentration school acknowledge that, 
especially when privately provided, these new infrastructures are likely to be biased towards 
certain regions and areas in the largest cities where the high-end users are located. These 
authors are worried that within so called hybrid space, access disparity may result from a 
‘digital divide’ that discriminates between users depending on both geographic location and 
buying power (Audirac 2002). 
 
While there seems to be some recognition also within the deconcentration school that ICTs 
do not simply neutralize distance, this tradition does tend to see the relationship between 
new technology and urban form as one of cause and effect in what amounts to a sort of 
technological determinism where the location choices of presumably rational economic 
actors are predicted or explained simply on the basis of land prices and new possibilities 
provided by technological advances (Graham & Marvin 2001). 
2.2.2 The restructuring school 
Representatives of the restructuring school have a far more complex understanding of the 
interaction between ICTs and society. The diverse writings within this school draw on such 
traditions as world systems theory, the post-Fordist formulations from the French regulation 
school, and the literature on world city formation and the network society.  
 Common to these contributions is the view that the current ICT-based socio-technical 
paradigm is integral to those fundamental changes in the organization of the world economy 
that were mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. Take for example the increasingly 
important role of transnational companies (TNCs) and global finance capital in the 
accumulation and distribution of wealth on all scales. While this is a trend that has been 
made possible by technological innovations, it also both influences and responds to “social 
innovations (organizational and institutional) inscribed in the productive and political 
practices of cities and regions” (Audirac 2002, 218). Entrepreneurial regimes are important 
examples of such social innovations. City governments increasingly take the global 
economy into account in policy formulations at the same time as the nature of that global 
economy relies on the urban policies of cities around the world. ICTs are seen an integral 
part of that economy. Restructuring scholars,  
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“conceptualize IT effects as fundamentally inscribed in a new capitalist 
spatial organization of production, with both global and local dimensions, 
intricately linked to the flows of physical materials, information, and people. 
Understanding IT effects on urban form requires understanding these flows 
and the fixity or flexibility of ground, air, water, and digital infrastructures” 
(Feldman in Audirac 2002, 219).  
This emphasis on how the spatial organization of the urban economy is related to the relative 
fixity of built infrastructures reminds us that distance is not dead at all and it brings us back 
to Harvey’s discussion of the role of infrastructure in the social, or political-economic, 
production of spaces. But before turning to that, I will look at what another branch of 
literature has to say about the socio-technical innovations and urban form, namely the world 
cities literature. 
World cities: Saskia Sassen 
Within the restructuring school, the literature on world cities understands the interrelated 
social and technological innovations of post-Fordism to have distinct effects on the 
geographies of cities. Saskia Sassen has been central in the world-city literature, and in what 
follows I will review some of the changes in urban form she attributes to the socio-technical 
transformation of society – the increasing importance of ICTs and entrepreneurial strategies.  
 In a summary of the world-city literature, Friedmann (1995) asserts that urban areas 
and agglomerations are likely to maintain their importance in the world economy despite 
widespread predictions to the contrary (i.e. the deconcentration school). Spatial 
concentration in cities, in the form of agglomeration or re-agglomeration economies, 
continues to serve a variety of purposes for corporate management requiring spaces of 
representation, interaction and innovation.  
 In accordance with this, Sassen (1994, 1995) writes that the notion of a ‘global’ 
economy where ICTs have neutralized distance provides a highly inadequate basis for an 
understanding of globalization and cities because it overlooks the spatial dimension of 
economic globalization that shows how cities are becoming an increasingly important arena 
for transnational economic activity. 
 
In the transformation of the economy since the 1970s Sassen emphasizes a decisive shift 
towards the service sector and especially towards what she calls producer services. 
Examples of such producer services are: financial, legal, and general management matters; 
innovation; development; design; administration; personnel; production technology; 
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maintenance; transport; communications; whole-sale distribution; advertising; cleaning 
services for firms; security; and storage. Sassen argues that “these services can be seen as 
part of the supply capacity of an economy because they facilitate adjustments to changing 
economic circumstances” (Sassen 1994, 55). The production process in these service 
industries requires highly specialized inputs from other service industries, and this creates a 
basis for agglomeration economies. In fact, when the high-level professional is said to 
require face-to-face interaction, this interaction is likely to be part of the production process 
in the producer services. Because these producer services are usually available only in urban 
environments, she argues that the role of the city as an economic entity is becoming more, 
rather than less important (Sassen 1995). 
 
Also, while certain manufacturing activities may be dispersing regionally and globally, this 
dispersion is organized around a parallel centralization of management and control 
operations. The 2001 UNCHS report on cities observes that, “It is precisely because of the 
territorial dispersal facilitated by telecommunication advances that agglomeration of 
centralizing activities has expanded immensely.” The management and control operations 
are an important part of the production process of the global ‘information economy’ and they 
continue to be place bound in several ways. The vast physical infrastructures required for 
such production are centered around strategic nodes where facilities for electronic 
communication are concentrated, and the professionals who depend on access to such 
facilities are required to locate their offices in proximity to these nodes. This is one reason 
why the office buildings of the information economy are to be found in major cities (Sassen 
1995, UNCHS 2001). 
 
Another development are the so called ‘edge cities’ that have been developing around 
metropolitan areas contributing to a more polycentric urban geography that represents 
representing a new tendency towards a reconcentration of economic activity at the urban 
periphery. Such edge cities are digitally networked to traditional central business districts 
(CBDs) and although they are not substituting the traditional center, they do serve as 
location for activities that previously would be found in the CBD and they might strengthen 
the intra-urban competition for investments (Sassen 1994).  
 
 32 
Sassen quotes a number of studies indicating that the new service dominated economy 
produces a larger share of low-wage jobs. The production processes also involve the work of 
secretaries and cleaning personnel, but we often forget the role of this ‘traditional’ sector of 
producer services, perhaps because the profits are vastly superior in the new growth sectors 
of the specialized services like finance and administration. Also, for labor, the more flexible 
forms of production associated with post-Fordism have meant more uncertain working 
conditions with more use of part-time and temporary work, both in the manufacture and 
service sector. The result is a tendency toward increased economic polarization accompanied 
by an uneven geography where the low wage service workers reside in (digitally) deprived 
neighborhoods and commute to work. This tendency is likely to be stronger in major cities 
because they concentrate the major growth sectors that are characterized by such significant 
income disparities, and also because massive concentrations of people create a market for 
small, low cost, and perhaps informal service operations (Sassen 1994, 1995). 
Harvey and the political economy of infrastructural change 
Harvey’s more theoretical approach to this issue does arrive at some similar conclusions. 
Harvey asserts that capitalism’s goal of complete spatial mobility, which indeed would 
amount to a ‘death of distance’, is of course unattainable. Both the spatial structures that 
form the basis of production and consumption – cities, industrial areas, etc. – as well as the 
infrastructure and transport networks required to produce mobility are fixed and embedded 
in produced space. Infrastructure networks are examples of locally dependent capital, 
representing large, immobile, sunk costs. As sunk costs, these investments are committed to 
a particular use in a particular place and they are not recoverable in case of exit. This 
dependency on the local place of investment makes infrastructure investments risky because 
their inflexibility imposes an immobility on capital that makes restructuring problematic. 
Harvey sees this as a tension between capitalism’s unavoidable fixity and its inherent need 
for mobility and circulation. For example, an urban (infrastructural) landscape that has been 
shaped in relation to a certain phase of development can later become a barrier to further 
accumulation. This tension will eventually have to be resolved through a crisis situation 
where infrastructure is left dead (as a sunk cost) to give way to the new configurations of 
space-time mobilities required to maintain profitable production. In Harvey’s view then, this 
constant infrastructural redevelopment is integral to the capitalist city and a driving force 
behind major changes in the urban structure where new terrains of winners and losers are 
created as new actors and areas will be provided with access or non-access in a process that 
 33
is bound to produce geographic unevenness. Because infrastructural change is always 
socially and economically biased, time and space barriers will always be collapsed in an 
uneven fashion that reveals the interconnectedness of spatiality, power and infrastructure. 
The production of infrastructure networks should be understood as an exercise infused with 
struggles between groups, firms and institutions possessing uneven social, economic and 
cultural power. A person’s or a group’s ability to exercise social and economic power 
derives from the degree in which they are able to mediate their lives through infrastructure 
and extend their influence over space. Therefore the production of infrastructure networks 
will reproduce power relations and reflect the highly uneven political-economic situation, 
with a reinforcement of existing capitalist social relations as a result (Casey 1998 in Graham 
& Marvin 2001, Harvey 1985 in Graham & Marvin 2001, Swyngedouw 1993 in Graham & 
Marvin 2001, Gertler 2000). 
 
As mentioned, political economic theory understands space as socially constructed. Within 
and through the city the uneven use and connection to networked infrastructures can be 
understood to reflect this construction. In the following I will take a closer look at the 
possible implications for the construction of space of what Graham and Marvin (2001) 
understand as the new social innovations in urban governance and infrastructural provision 
under post-Fordism. 
Post-Fordism and splintering geographies 
Graham & Marvin (2001) claim that the unbundling of infrastructural networks that they 
associate with post-Fordism is likely to lead to a fragmentation of the infrastructural and 
social fabric of the city. They have labeled this development ‘splintering urbanism’. In 
developing countries where the existing infrastructure is almost always inadequate such 
splintering might have particularly stark consequences. The increased possibility for and 
acceptance of differentiation between users of infrastructure networks according to the logic 
of the ‘free’ market is likely to contribute to further marginalization of less ‘valuable’ users 
and areas. The processes of unbundling allow for more diverse, or uneven, urban 
infrastructural landscapes, while the ideal of a ‘rationally’ planned and coherent city is 
undermined. Because connectedness is increasingly important for the participation in the 
economy, the increasingly uneven availability of infrastructure is expected to contribute to 
the future reproduction of social and spatial inequalities (UNCHS 2001).  
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 These splintering processes can be slow as the immense values already sunk into 
cities’ infrastructure are bound to create certain inertia. Also there are many cases of 
privatization where the urban authorities strive to keep the integrity of the existing 
infrastructure networks intact through franchising deals and continued regulation of the 
whole city. Nonetheless, the increasing pressure for liberalization and privatization allows 
new private infrastructural competitors to begin assailing the more or less coherent, if 
limited, urban networks left over from the era of modern planning. Networks of ICT 
infrastructure are no exception, and the networks that support the latest technology is often 
marketed in a liberalized and deregulated environment right from its introduction. The 
imperative is almost everywhere to privatize and liberalize infrastructure to support the 
profitability of an increasingly international capital (Graham & Marvin 2001). 
 The resulting social and infrastructural geographies of splintering cities are 
characterized by an increasing complexity. Multiple, overlapping networks may connect 
isolated islands of spaces across the city with other cities around the world, while other 
spaces within the same city remain virtually unconnected both globally and locally. These 
new geographies derive from how unbundling makes it possible to ‘bypass’ users, in three 
important ways: ‘Local bypassing’ consists in the construction of new infrastructure that 
connects valued users and excludes non-valued users within a city. Global-local, or ‘glocal’, 
bypassing consists in connecting valued local users with global networks while, again, other 
non-valued localities within the city are excluded. Lastly, with the aid of advancing 
information technology, it is increasingly possible to supply competitive services on a single 
physically integrated, network. Such so-called ‘virtual network bypassing’ makes it possible 
to differentiate between users’ access to services on the already existing network. This 
practice is very common already; take for instance the way Internet providers offer a 
selection of (differently priced) band-widths for connections through one and the same line 
(Graham & Marvin 2001). 
 Graham and Marvin’s (2001) focus on the relative distancing of non-valued spaces 
and users, reflects a relational perspective on space and time. This perspective shows how 
infrastructure networks that no longer correspond to the city as a coherent territory are part 
of a reconstruction of socio-spatial relations. Increasingly, links between infrastructure and 
territory are characterized by unevenness on all spatial scales. Castells (2000) point out that 
infrastructural bypassing in the form of improved and often invisible interconnections 
between valued spaces often have a visible counterpart in the form gates, walls and 
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surveillance cameras that create a paradoxical reinforcement of local boundaries to 
movement and interaction within the city.  
 
The above reflections on how geographies can be splintered through uneven connections to 
infrastructural networks are important for an understanding how new spaces develop in the 
city. The most valued spaces are likely to be well connected to networks that effectively 
bypass less prosperous nearby spaces, and this is especially likely to occur in cities in the 
South where the economic contrasts are starker. In fact connectedness, to transport networks 
for example, can be decisive for the location of valued spaces. For high-value residential 
areas or office buildings connectedness to transportation and information networks can offer 
the double advantage of bypassing lower-status areas (i.e. slums) in the physical proximity 
while assuring a relative proximity to the down-town business district. This illustrates the 
point that networks may partially neutralize distance, but never in a socially neutral way. 
Space-time compression through infrastructure may work to integrate the socially and 
economically powerful while simultaneously excluding the poor, both relatively and 
absolutely.  
 While unbundling makes bypassing easier than ever before, entrepreneurial strategies 
of city governance give private interests and investors more to say in the development of 
infrastructure. This parallel development provides developers of infrastructure with both the 
means (bypassing) and the goal (profit) to create new space-time compressions that 
exclusively serve to tie valued spaces closer to other valued spaces.  
 
Unbundling provides the affluent with important new possibilities of connection in a process 
that also involves new forms of exclusion. How are these new possibilities of exclusive 
networking used in the construction of Chacao as a valued space within Caracas? To the 
degree that infrastructural connectedness plays an important role in economic life, an uneven 
infrastructure can be expected to reinforce the marginalization of those that are left 
unconnected. Intense social polarization is characteristic for most countries and cities in the 
South including Venezuela, and the entrepreneurial policies that are sought by many cities 
around the world are thought to reinforce the uneven development as the parallel 
technological advances make it possible to differentiate between users on basis of what and 
how much they consume.  
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2.3 Concluding remarks 
The profound changes in the urban governance and infrastructural scenarios of cities in the 
post-Fordist era play an important role in the literature on contemporary urban geographies. 
ICTs are part of a thorough-going socio-technical transformation of society, where urban 
form more than ever is determined by global and local business decisions “nurtured by the 
entrepreneurial state” (Audirac 2002, 223). The precise relationship between new ICTs and 
urban form is not given – both centralizing and decentralizing tendencies are at work. 
However a post-Fordist economy where both the distribution of capital and the provision of 
infrastructure to an increasing degree are regulated according to free-market ideals rather 
than ideals of social equity is likely to produce more complex urban geographies 
characterized by increasingly uneven and fragmented socio-spatial structures. Later I will 
examine how the theoretical perspectives and concepts that have been reviewed in this 
chapter relate to the dynamics of the urban geography of Caracas. 
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3. Method 
3.1 Qualitative research 
I have chosen a qualitative approach for this research project. In contrast to quantitative 
research, qualitative research is based on non-quantitative observations that are analyzed in 
non-statistical ways. Where quantitative research often can be said to regard social science 
as analogous to natural science, and to regard its object of study as something stable, 
existing independently of the analyst, qualitative research locates the social scientist within 
the social world acknowledging that ´reality’ is to some degree constructed and not simply 
uncovered. The researcher is often personally involved in the collection of the data and the 
researcher’s understanding of relevancy is central to the interpretation of that data. Although 
the data always will allow various interpretations, some interpretations will be more 
compelling for theoretical reasons or on grounds of internal consistency (Dooley 1990, 
Halvorsen 1993, Punch 1998, Smith 2000). 
 In qualitative approaches multiple strategies and methods are often employed, and the 
range of what can count as data and how to collect them is wider. Because the qualitative 
approach is more exploratory and open-ended, the structure of the design and the data will 
often be developed only as the empirical work proceeds (Punch 1998). 
 A qualitative approach allows the researcher to get an in-depth understanding of one 
or a few units, but any generalizations arising from qualitative studies will never be of a 
statistical nature. The researcher's aim is rather to gain a thorough understanding of the 
object under study: its logic, its arrangements and its explicit and implicit rules. This aspect 
of qualitative research implies that such research never can be experimental – it needs to be 
undertaken in the natural setting of the people or events under study (Punch 1998).  
 Qualitative research can bring about a better understanding of a real event and it is 
often pointed out that it may serve an important function preparing the grounds for 
quantitative research which is often perceived as more ’useful’ because it allows the 
researcher to make statistical generalizations from sample to population. It is true that an 
exploratory qualitative study can aid other researchers find new relevant research questions 
or variables for their studies – for example, a qualitative investigation of an ´old’ topic may 
help renew perspectives within too ´conservative’ fields of research – but as it is argued in 
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the next section, the qualitative case study may also give us information that is valuable per 
se, or even generalizable in a non statistical sense. 
3.2 The case study 
In qualitative case study research there are just one or a few units of investigation, for 
example one social system, one company. Often, what the researcher considers typical cases 
are selected, not as samples for statistical generalization, but for analytic purposes. Using 
whatever methods appropriate, one case will be studied in detail with the general objective 
of developing as full an understanding as possible of that case. The insights such research 
brings can be valuable because the particular case is so important or because it is a so called 
negative case that does not conform with expectations, but often the aim is also to gain a 
better understanding of other similar cases, and that rises the issue of generalizability (Punch 
1998).  
 
According to Punch (1998) a case study may produce results that in some sense are 
generalizable, or transferable, in two ways: The first is by conceptualizing – methods for 
analysis that focus on conceptualizing rather than mere description allow the researcher to 
develop new concepts to describe some aspect of the case; The second is by developing 
propositions (hypotheses) that link concepts within the case. Concepts and propositions are 
generalizable or transferable in the sense that they can be useful for understanding other 
situations, and for research on other cases.  
 Generally the case study can be understood as an empirical inquiry that uses multiple 
sources of evidence in an investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context. It is more a strategy than a method: a way of organizing social data so as to preserve 
the unitary character of the social object or process being studied (Halvorsen 1993, Punch 
1998). 
3.3 The data material 
The data material for the present case study was collected ‘on site’ in Caracas, in the course 
of 2 months of field work between June and August in 2004. The principal aim of the 
fieldwork was to gather information about the nature and relative importance of factors that 
are decisive the location of company headquarters in Caracas, with the purpose of 
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uncovering the reasons for the relative success the municipality of Chacao has had within the 
DMC when it comes to attracting investments. I collected these data through observation, 
documents and statistics, and most importantly, through interviews with representatives of 
companies and authorities in Caracas. 
 
Observations 
I stayed in Caracas for a period of 2 months and this allowed me to gain a much better 
understanding of the geography and organization of the city. I got to know first-hand some 
of the challenges that the inhabitants face in terms of transport and personal safety and this 
experience was an essential foundation for the formulation of relevant interview questions 
and for the understanding of the answers given by the interviewees. Talking to people, and 
participating at public events and conferences related to the local urban reality contributed 
greatly to my understanding of what the important issues were from a local perspective. 
 
Documents 
I found many public documents, statistics, and research and news paper articles on topics 
related to mine. I was often able to buy or make photocopies of the material I thought 
interesting. At other times I made use of a digital camera to digitalize and reproduce 
documents. Many public documents, such as official statistics and municipal plans often 
proved either hard to find, hard to get a copy of, or simply non-existent. When such 
documents were available they were not always updated, for example it is a problem that 
official statistics do not include good data on the significant unregulated territories of the 
city. 
 
Qualitative interviews 
The informed interview is suitable for gathering information on phenomena that the 
researcher does not have the opportunity to observe on his own. Such interviews may be 
undertaken with persons with first hand knowledge of the phenomena under study serving as 
a sort of substitute observers (Halvorsen 1993). 
 I conducted a total of 22 interviews with: Representatives of companies that were 
situated in Chacao; Representatives of the planning authorities on both municipal and 
metropolitan levels; Representatives of the main companies that supply the various 
 40 
municipalities of the DMC with fiber optic telecommunications infrastructure; And also with 
a selection of local experts (see appendix). 
 The interviews with the representatives of the companies were conducted on the basis 
of series of questions or topics that I formulated before-hand, giving the interviews a semi-
structured form. The same is true for the interviews with the local governments. Their semi-
structuredness made them easier to compare afterwards, but especially during the first 
interviews it was important to follow the structure only loosely and for the questions to be 
open in order to allow for unexpected perspectives and answers. Later, as I had a better 
understanding of the situation, it was possible to improve the structure of the interviews and 
formulate more adequate questions.  
 With the local experts I was interested in their perspective on the urban 
developments under study so I opened for a more open-ended discussion of the topic while 
with the suppliers of infrastructure the interviews were aimed more at obtaining concrete 
information and were thus characterized by the inclusion of more closed questions in the 
discussions. 
 All the interviews were recorded on minidisk, except with Statoil where the subject 
did not wish to have the interview recorded and I took notes instead. I also took notes during 
the recorded interviews whenever I felt it could aid me with the transcription process.  
 In accordance with the subjects’ preference the interviews were undertaken at the 
subjects’ offices, and always with a prior appointment. I believe this provided an optimal 
setting for the interviews as I got to meet the subjects in a location and situation he/she was 
familiar and at ease with, and there were few interruptions. Undertaking the interviews at the 
subjects’ offices also gave me an opportunity to familiarize myself with the area under 
study, and observe the companies and their location. Having agreed on appointments 
beforehand, the interviewees were generously conceding enough time for the interviews 
once we managed to meet and start talking. The interviewees were generally very helpful 
and no-one seemed to perceive the questions as controversial, in fact many said they found 
the topic interesting and seemed to enjoy talking about their city and their municipality. 
Only in on one case did I meet a little resistance and made to feel that time was running 
short (Banco Federal). My overall impression was that people liked to talk with me as a 
foreigner. I believe being a foreigner in some ways was an advantage in the interview 
situation because as an outsider to the political conflict I was considered politically neutral 
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in the highly polarized political atmosphere in Venezuela, a status that I think gave me more 
freedom regarding the political ‘correctness’ of my questions. 
Transcription 
I transcribed the interviews as soon as possible after their realization while I still had them 
fresh in my memory. While still remembering the interview situation, and with the assistance 
of the notes taken during the interviews, I could make a better interpretation of the 
interviews in the transcription process. Because of the often ‘factual’ nature of the subject 
matter, I did not consider it was necessary to transcribe the interviews in their entirety, word-
by-word, and I omitted hesitations and errors. All the interviews were conducted in Spanish 
with the exception of the interview with the representative of Statoil, which was conducted 
in Norwegian. I translated the interviews and quotes into English myself. Translating the 
interviews was not difficult, in part because I made an effort during the interviews to have 
the interviewees explain ambiguities and things I did not understand. 
 
Challenges  
The principal challenge in the collection of the data was to contact with the interviewees. 
Assuming that a person of a higher position in a company would be likely to have more 
knowledge on the advantages (and disadvantages) of the localization of the company, I 
chose to primarily contact with company directors or high ranking personnel. The persons 
holding such positions were not always easy to get through to and when they or their 
secretaries could be reached, they were not always willing to concede time for an interview. 
In this situation, where I as a researcher need access to informed subject within a closed 
environment, I found it convenient to employ what has been called a ‘snowball’ method for 
selection where one informant would recommend me to talk to other informants. 
Establishing contact became easier as I had developed a kind of network of people that could 
put me in contact with people they knew in other companies (Halvorsen 1997). 
 Nevertheless it was a recurring problem that the interview subjects simply did not 
keep their appointments or postponed them repeatedly. Also when interviewees had agreed 
to send me more information or documentation later, this was often forgotten and it was 
necessary to spend a significant amount of time on repeated prompting. 
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Reliability 
The reliability of a measure is its consistency. Bayley (1987) defines a measure as reliable if 
repeated measurements would produce a different result if and only if the concept being 
measured has changed. For example, a research interview in scientific investigation will not 
be reliable if the interviewed does not understand the questions as they were intended.  
 I believe the semi-structured open-ended form of the interviews undertaken in this 
research project made it easier to detect misinterpretations of the research questions. There 
were good possibilities for clearing up misunderstandings because the interviewed were 
allowed to elaborate quite freely in his answers, and because of the interaction that the 
dialogue-like interviews allowed.  
 There is always a risk that the interviewed somehow will feel pressured to say what 
he/she believes the interviewer wants to hear, or to answer on an insufficient basis because 
he/she feels uncomfortable with admitting not to know the answer to a question. To avoid 
this it is important that the atmosphere is comfortable and relaxed so the interviewee can feel 
at ease. As mentioned my status as foreigner my have taken some of the ´political edge’ off 
my questions because of my supposed ignorance, and in conducting the interviews I felt that 
it was possible to maintain a rather friendly and unpretentious atmosphere. On the other 
hand, given the political situation and my status as foreigner, the interviewed were 
sometimes untruthful or biased in their answers perhaps because they wanted to give a 
certain impression of that situation. As I became more familiar with the topics of the local 
political landscape however I felt it was increasingly easy however to identify political 
stereotypes, and to avoid ending up with politicized answers by asking additional questions 
when necessary.  
 
Validity 
For a measurement to be valid its essential that the concept actually measured is identical 
with the intended one and that it is measured accurately. For example, in this study it was 
my intention to collect data on the factors that influence in companies decisions about where 
to localize. I chose to collect those data through interviews with local representatives of 
companies assuming that these have first-hand information, or at least knowledge about the 
relevance of such factors. Of course I have no good way of knowing to what degree the 
interviews with these local representatives gave me data on the actual decisions on where to 
localize, or whether the data merely reflects the personal observations of the interviewed. 
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Especially with the transnational companies the decision about the company’s location may 
have been taken by headquarters in the companies’ countries of origin and not by the local 
personnel. However in selecting subjects for the interviews I tried to contact with as high 
ranking personnel as possible, hoping they had the relevant knowledge, and all the 
interviewed did prove to have firm opinions on the subject matter.  
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4. Analysis: Agglomeration and polarization in 
Caracas – the case of Chacao 
Since the end of the 1980s the Venezuelan economy has gone through changes associated 
with a shift towards post-Fordism with policies of economic liberalization and an extensive 
privatization of many state enterprises including the telecommunications company CANTV. 
Also, much of the governing authority of the DMC was decentralized to municipal level. In 
the beginning of the 1990s three new municipalities were created bringing the total number 
of municipalities in the DMC up from two to five. The resulting deregulated and 
decentralized nature of the DMC has reinforced intra-city competition for private 
investments. The initiative of private capital becomes increasingly central to the production 
of wealth locally within the DMC.  
 The decentralization of governing authority and the liberalization of the economy and 
the telecommunications services have not been accompanied by any simple decentralization 
of economic wealth and power. Although the historical center in the municipality of 
Libertador seems to be losing its role as the unquestioned location of the city’s CBD, the 
major economic actors are not simply spreading out across the city. In spite of the increased 
locational flexibility supposedly offered by new ICTs there has not been any notable move 
towards less central lower cost areas as the decentralization school would predict, instead a 
tendency towards an even tighter re-agglomeration of business in the municipality of Chacao 
can be observed.  
 The municipalities of the DMC face very different realities in terms of population 
density, employment and income, and although some municipalities have been able to meet 
the increased competition for private investments with a more or less successful employment 
of entrepreneurial strategies, competition between places is, as pointed out by Harvey in the 
previous chapter, bound to produce losers as well as winners. In Caracas the economic 
growth of the municipality of Chacao since its creation in 1991 clearly places it among the 
winners.  
 In the following, various possible causes of this tendency towards agglomeration or 
re-agglomeration of economic activity will be considered. Section 4.1 will bring a 
consideration of the role of fiber optic ICT networks in the agglomeration process observed 
in Caracas. As pointed out in chapter 2, ICT infrastructure has been given much attention in 
 45
recent discussions of urban form and change, and here I will explore the concrete situation 
regarding the extension and relevance of such infrastructure in Caracas, on the basis of 
interviews undertaken with the main providers of fiber optic connections in the city. Later, in 
section 4.2, I will continue this exploration through a series of interviews with 
representatives of a selection of companies that have decided to locate in Chacao to see in 
what ways these consider ICTs a relevant factor in their location strategies. I will then 
expand that discussion to include other possible factors that cause the companies to 
agglomerate in Chacao. Lastly, in section 4.3, I will consider the changes in the 
administrative situation of Caracas and Chacao’s special position within the DMC since its 
origin as a municipality in the context of the decentralization process of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s.  
4.1 Agglomeration and ICTs 
The advanced infrastructure for ICTs in the form of fiber optic networks is relatively new to 
Caracas. They have been developed since the 1990s, when the providers of 
telecommunication services had already been privatized and in a period the 
telecommunications was being liberalized. Complete liberalization was reached in 2000. In 
chapter 2 I exposed some of Graham and Marvin’s (2001) predictions regarding the related 
processes of unbundling and liberalization of service-provision, where these were thought 
likely to contribute to a further fragmentation of the urban infrastructural landscapes as they 
challenge the ideal of universal provision. Graham and Marvin (2001) point out that 
unbundling and liberalization bring new possibilities for user differentiation that make it 
easier and more lucrative to service the high-end users exclusively. This they argue might 
result in a form of digital segregation with super-connected enclaves within an urban 
landscape. 
 All provision of networked services in Caracas is currently privatized and liberalized. 
When it comes to the development of fiber optic networks the central or local government 
has had no involvement in their elaboration. According to a high ranking Engineer at TelCel, 
a major provider of corporate fiber optic network connections in Venezuela, the 
development of such networks were begun only after the national telecommunications 
company CANTV was privatized and sold to an American company in 1993. CANTV had a 
monopoly in the telecommunications market except for in mobile telephony, until the market 
was completely liberalized in 2000. But the fiber optic networks have not only been subject 
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to liberalization, they have been de facto un-regulated in the whole period because, as the 
OLPU admits, “the municipality has not been able to control this activity.” And the state 
organ regulating the communications infrastructure, CONATEL, has not supervised the 
construction of such networks either. The companies that provide these services simply cut 
the streets open and put their own cables. A major provider of fiber optics in Caracas, 
NetUno, says that with the lack of regulation and legislation, “[…] it’s a chaos down there. 
No on one knows what’s where when you cut the street open.” 
This means that these networks have not been shaped according to any urbanistic 
plan but rather according to the needs and possibilities supplied by the market – connection 
to fiber optic infrastructure is delivered as a typically unbundled service and universal 
access is definitely not on the agenda. 
 
In what follows, I will explore the geography of the advanced ICT-infrastructure in the form 
of fiber optic networks in Caracas that has resulted from this situation. I will investigate 
whether the distribution of the networks is more or less uniform throughout the city or 
whether it is restricted to certain areas and users in digitally privileged enclaves. Then, on 
the basis of interviews with all the major providers of fiber optical networks in Caracas, I 
will consider the relationship between digital connectivity and the agglomeration process – 
if the ICT infrastructure is better developed in the areas where business prefers to locate, is 
this because the infrastructure contributes to agglomeration or is it the agglomeration itself 
that attracts investments in infrastructure? 
4.1.1 The digital geography of Caracas  
The following map shows the extension of the corporate fiber optic networks in Caracas that 
have been built by the three most important providers of this kind of infrastructure in 
Venezuela. It was not possible to obtain a similar map from the last of the important 
providers, namely AES (Electricidad Caracas). The General Manager of AES would not 
reveal the exact information on the location of the company’s clients, but he did explain that 
their clients were all among the largest TNCs and that they were all located within the 
central areas of Caracas. He considered the information obtained from the three other 
companies representative for the totality of corporate clients connected to fiber optics in 
Caracas (see map 5, p49). 
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Map 5 (facing page) shows the totality of optic fibers installed in the DMC by the three 
major providers TelCel, CANTV, and NetUno. There is a high density of fibers in the 
historical center (traditional CBD) of Libertador; the area can be recognized on the map by 
the regular shape of the street blocks. There are also cables connecting the campus area of 
the Central University to the South-East of the historical center. In the central areas of 
Chacao (emerging CBD) there is a particularly high density, and to the South of Chacao, in 
the commercial area of Baruta there are also cables. There are cables also towards the 
industrial areas of Sucre to the East, and in what appears to be a closed circuit within the 
campus of the Simón Bolívar University to the South, in Baruta. Apart from these limited 
and well defined areas there is practically no place where a company could be located and 
have access to this kind of infrastructure. 
 The areas with the most extensive optical infrastructure are obviously the central 
areas of Libertador, and Chacao. The absolute extension of fiber optics in these areas is 
comparable, indicating that a greater part of the CBD of Chacao is covered as it is less 
extensive than that of Libertador. Importantly, Chacao also has a comparably high number of 
its office buildings connected. An Engineer with NetUno comments on the map that, “[…] 
these are the buildings connected by us in Libertador. They are few. If you look at Chacao, 
the large majority of the important buildings in Chacao are connected.” 
Along the same lines a high-ranking Engineer at TelCel, comments on the map that, 
“Here, in the Historical center, the public government is represented, the Central Park. But 
if one wants this service there, there is not as much as in this area [Chacao]. In fact the 
majority of our installations are located here in Chacao.” In fact, he says, “It’s possible that 
the area that has more optic fiber, that uses it more, all use it, but where the resources are 
concentrated, is precisely in Chacao. […] Over here [Chacao] you have all the big 
corporations. The big corporations that require these services are located in this sector 
[Chacao].” 
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4.1.2 Agglomeration and connectivity 
In the previous section it is shown that the fiber optic networks in Caracas have a very 
limited extension, and that the access to such infrastructure is much better in the central 
areas of Libertador and Chacao than in other parts of the city. The connection between these 
two areas that are also the locations of the two major business agglomerations in Caracas is 
also particularly strong. Sassen’s (chapter 2) description of how ‘edge-cities’ may develop as 
competing centers of investment around metropolitan areas, but always intensely networked 
to the traditional CBD, springs to mind. Chacao is of course in no sense any edge-city, but 
as an emerging alternative CBD, it is certainly intensely connected to the traditional CBD 
(see map 5). This might suggest that the ICT infrastructure and the communication it 
provides with the traditional center is a necessary condition for the reagglomeration process, 
but it might as well be the other way round, i.e. that the fiber is provided for the two areas 
because of the density of business there.  
 The Project Administrator at NetUno says fiber optics are becoming a must for 
corporations in Caracas, that, “Paradoxically, given the economic down in our country the 
last years, we have had a significant growth in corporate clients the last two years.” He says 
that the clients are “[…] in general large companies, and banks. There is not a significant 
difference between multinationals and nationals. The large multinationals might require a 
somewhat larger bandwidth and backups.” The interviewed Engineer at TelCel says the 
clients are often banks, but TelCel also has clients within manufacture, “[…] when they have 
the head office in Caracas and the factories outside Caracas. This is the case with many 
firms, because Caracas is the economic center of the country.”  
The General Director of AES that owns Electricidad Caracas, on the other hand, says 
the price-level of their fiber optic services is so high that it effectively excludes most national 
companies from connecting through their network, limiting the clientele to the large foreign-
owned TNCs. 
The Engineer at TelCel explains that extending the fiber optic network can be quite 
costly because the street has to broken up along where the cables are to be put. As a 
consequence, when TelCel decide on where to put their cables they need to “consider how 
connecting can be rentable. If they pay us 1 million dollars and the investment is 500 
thousand… this will depend also on the existence of other firms, potential clients in the 
area.”  This means that TelCel considers it safer to extend their network into areas where 
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there are many firms that might require connection, i.e. large corporations, banks and 
headquarters. 
NetUno also says that before expanding the network, 
“we study the market. We analyze whether on the way to that company there 
are other buildings that might need a connection in the future. If there are, 
then we’ll absorb a part of the costs of the construction. The rest will be 
installation costs [for the client]. If they are on top of the network you might 
not charge for the installation at all.” 
In other words it will be cheaper for companies to have fiber optics installed if they 
are located closer to an existing network, and according to NetUno this is a factor that the 
companies increasingly have to take into account when they are considering a location: “In 
the beginning it was rather we who looked for them. This may work the other way also, now 
that the network is established.” 
The Engineer from TelCel also says that areas with a previous existence of a fiber-
optic network are more attractive for business because when it is not necessary to break open 
the street to arrive with the cables it will be cheaper to get a connection there. That is why, 
he says, “This Avenue [Francisco de Miranda, Chacao] is very attractive – because there are 
many important clients there. So CANTV, TelCel, NetUno and Electricidad  Caracas all 
pass by here [with fiber optic cables].” He explains that, 
“Toyota for example – this client requires the services of two operators. One 
is us. […] So then we calculate the costs of getting to that place with fiber 
optics, and because my network doesn’t reach that building as of now, it’s 
necessary to extend the network. We need to make a new canalization to reach 
that building. Some of that cost is going to be paid by the client. If the 
building was a little bit more to the North it would be much more expensive.” 
Another indication that the existence of a fiber optic network makes the land more attractive 
is the way it affects the land-prices positively. The President of the real-estate consultancy 
Miguel Chacón & Associates explains that,  
“The presence of fiber optics, and technology in general, increases the 
demand for the land. […] And with a scarcity of land […], the prices 
increase. And one observes that within the same street [in Caracas], between a 
building that has technology and a building that doesn’t, there’s a price 
difference of almost 30%.” 
NetUno also believes the existence of fiber optics adds significant value to the area. Their 
Project Manager says this is because the companies that are locating in Caracas look for the 
existence of these cables: “[…] They will have connection as a condition,” he says, and 
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explains that the companies will call the suppliers before moving and ask whether there are 
possibilities of connection: 
“There are TNCs that have moved from one place to another, and for them to 
move to new offices, they will call us and say: we’re thinking of moving from 
this tower to that tower, can you connect us there? -Yes? Ahh, Ok.” 
 
In sum, these findings suggest that the previous existence of a fiber optic network does 
represent a factor that guides investments while at the same time the providers of network-
services are profit-driven and choose to develop the infrastructure according to where the 
high-end users are located because of the demand that they represent. The observation that in 
liberalized telecommunications regimes “the private sector builds where the high volume 
and the money is” (Habitat 2001, 9) is an accurate description of the situation. In Caracas 
these high-end users, mostly large corporations, are located in the CBD in the historical 
center of Libertador and also in the ‘competing’ CBD of Chacao and consequently the 
advanced ICT-infrastructure in Caracas is to a significant degree geographically limited to 
these areas. As connection to fiber optic networks has become a common requirement for 
corporations that are looking for office locations, the limited extension of the networks has 
in itself become a factor that might contribute to further agglomeration. 
The findings directly contradict the predictions of the decentralization school which 
postulates that the introduction of new ICT-networks ‘neutralizes distance’ with a simple 
dispersal of business activity as a result. On the other hand they are very much in accordance 
with Graham and Marvin’s (2001) relational perspective on the impact of new 
infrastructures on the urban geography. Graham and Marvin’s approach allows us to grasp 
how ICTs indeed do shrink time/space relations, but not in an even fashion. In Caracas the 
selective development of fiber optic networks seems to reinforce existing business locations 
including the relatively new agglomeration in Chacao. 
4.2 Agglomeration in Chacao: investors’ perspectives 
In order to explain the process of economic agglomeration that is occurring in Chacao it is 
necessary to understand what the factors are that influence the location strategies of the 
companies that move there. In my attempt to uncover the reasons for the re-agglomeration of 
important economic actors within the territory of Chacao therefore, my approach has been to 
talk with representatives from a selection of firms located in Chacao about what advantages 
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a location in Chacao has to offer them. The subjective perspectives of the different 
companies on this issue may shed light on what the actual considerations are that decide 
which locations end up as losers and winners in the competition for investments.  
4.2.1 Digital accessibility / Telecommunications infrastructure 
The digital accessibility of an area is defined by the availability of infrastructure for 
information and communication technology (ICT) in the area. The concept of digital 
accessibility is complementary to that of physical accessibility and its importance in the day-
to-day operation of the modern enterprise is increasingly important in a globalizing economy 
that relies on exchange of information in real-time. The development of advanced ICT, such 
as fiber optics, is costly and the extension of such networks is therefore likely to be limited. 
In this section I will explore to what degree the interviewed companies value digital 
accessibility in their location strategies and how they perceive Chacao in this respect.  
 
ICTs are important. All the interviewed companies say they are reliant on a good connection 
to the Internet and almost all are connected through state of the art fiber optic connections or 
plan on upgrading. There were some indications that the foreign-owned TNCs have 
somewhat higher requirements regarding high-speed connections; the Director of Kodak 
Venezuela for example, explains that ICT has made it possible to centralize the structure of 
the transnational company internationally with the result that “there are a lot of things that 
aren’t being done in Venezuela anymore.”  In a recent restructuring of Kodak more 
functions have been assigned to the central headquarters in the US and real-time 
international connections have become more important than ever. 
Likewise, the Vice-President of Statoil Venezuela explains that it is “Crucial to be 
able to communicate with the oil rig. The operations are directed both from here, but more 
often from Norway. Good, secure connections are necessary.” 
The Account Manager at SUN Microsystems, also a transnational company, explains 
that the different branches of the company are integrated by a fiber-optic network that allows 
them to communicate in real-time globally: “If you pick up a phone here and mark an 
extension they can pick it up in San Francisco, or in Madrid.”  
The construction company A.S.S.A, which is one of the few interviewed companies 
of purely national capital, is not connected to any fiber optic network. However the 
Corporate Accounts Manager at IBM, a transnational company that also provides ICT 
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services, says that: “It doesn’t matter whether they (the companies) are national or 
multinational. The telecommunications networks are more important for the companies in 
the service sector – we have many national clients that invest in telecommunications.” 
 
Whether or not the demand for ICT is higher among the TNCs, it is clear that the 
interviewed companies share the perception that advanced telecommunications networks are 
readily available within the municipality of Chacao which thus fulfills an important criteria 
as a business location. The Vice President of Organizational and Human Management at 
Digitel-Tim says, “there is no doubt that we need to be in a place where there are very 
concrete possibilities of connections of the highest technology and fiber optics is a part of 
this. We couldn’t be equally efficient in a location where this wasn’t available. It would be 
slower, different.” 
Kodak Venezuela, which has just moved from Libertador, is also very satisfied with 
the digital accessibility in Chacao. The Director says that, “In Chacao there’s more 
connectivity. And almost all the telephone centrals here are digital, over there [Libertador] 
they have still got the old ones [analog] – still the third world.” And not only does “[…] the 
telephone central in Chacao [have] sufficient capacity,” but, “the building was already 
prepared when we came here and had everything, also fiber optics. It had the last mile of all 
the services,” while, “in Libertador we had to have an antenna to get the last mile.”  
With ‘the last mile’ it is referred to the stretch of cable that connects the office to the nearest 
communications central. Without the previous existence of a ICT networks, ‘the last mile’ 
will often be the most costly part of installing for example fiber optic cables because in order 
to put the cables in the ground in an urban environment it will usually be necessary to break 
open a trench in the road. Even for a sizeable company like Kodak the costs made that 
alternative “unthinkable” even though an antenna provides a slower and much less secure 
connection. In the same way, explains the Accounts Manager at SUN Microsystems, “[…] 
The problem with satellite is that you lose connection when it rains.” As a result, he says, 
“all the larger and multinational companies in Chacao have got fiber optics now.” 
The Corporate Accounts Manager at IBM believes the high density of companies 
with such requirements in Chacao brings further advantages in terms of high speed 
connectivity, because it makes it more lucrative for the providers of ICT infrastructure to 
invest in the area: 
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“Without doubt to be in a place like this is an advantage because there are 
many places through which you can get connected. This is a trafficated area. 
Upon concentrating that many companies that need access to Internet and 
private connections, obviously they [the providers] have allocated their 
infrastructure aiming at areas like this one. Which means that you’ll have a 
way of getting connected quickly and without much investment on the part of 
the company that supplies. There are areas where these companies would not 
have the same capacity.” 
He goes on to explain that for telecommunications companies in the service sector, like 
IBM, the fact that they have all localized in Chacao has not been “[…] a premeditated plan 
on the part of the industry as such.” He prefers to explain the agglomeration within the 
sector as a cumulative process – “Getting connected in Chacao is inexpensive and fast 
because of the previous existence of a network” he says. What happens is that “one 
company sees where its best to localize and then the rest localize there also.”  
This perspective on the relationship between changes in the infrastructural landscape 
and the agglomeration of investments is supported by the President of the real-estate agency 
Chacón & Associates who explained (chapter 4.1) that the m² price goes up significantly 
when fiber optics are installed. 
 
From the interviews it seems evident that the companies value digital accessibility highly in 
their location strategies. Because the expansion of ICT infrastructure, in the form of fiber 
optic networks is costly, it can be an advantage to locate in an area where such infrastructure 
is already developed. While this could be a significant factor in the on-going agglomeration 
process witnessed in Chacao, it was evident from the interviews with the providers of this 
infrastructure that there is also a tendency going in the other direction, i.e. that a 
concentration of such infrastructure within Chacao results from the investments strategies of 
the providers of the ICT-infrastructure that are likely to aim at areas where a large number 
high-end users are located. It is possible that these two processes co-exist. In any case such 
processes would contribute to a spiraling development where density (of business / 
infrastructure) brings density (of infrastructure / business). In Chapter 2 Graham and Marvin 
(2001) suggested that a growing fragmentation of the infrastructural landscape could result 
from unbundling processes and privatization. The findings from Caracas seem to coincide 
with that argument as it shows how the logic of the ‘free’ market could be contributing to a 
highly uneven geographic development with the creation of super-connected ‘islands’ within 
the city. One the one hand, ICT-infrastructure is likely to be supplied primarily to certain 
privileged areas of the city, on the other; the increase in land prices associated with the 
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development of such infrastructure will make it unavailable to smaller enterprises with 
further economic and infrastructural polarization between privileged and non-privileged 
areas as a result. 
4.2.2 Safety 
The importance of safety as a factor in the location strategies of the firms that were 
interviewed is unquestionable. From the interviews, personal safety seems to be a major 
factor with a clear geographic aspect to it where the territory of Chacao is considered 
relatively safe. All the interviewed firms pointed out the importance of a safe environment 
for their employees and clients, and that they perceived their location to be safer than 
alternative locations in other municipalities.  
To understand this intense focus on safety it is important to keep in mind that 
Caracas is considered a very unsafe city. Crime rates are high with everything from petty 
theft to armed assaults and murder occurring daily. This contributes to a climate of fear 
where people avoid going to public places, and especially places they are not familiar with. 
Going out after dark is not advisable in most areas except by car or taxi. A murder ratio of 
113 per 100 000 inhabitants per year places Caracas among the most violent cities in Latin 
America (Calvo 2004). Within the DMC however the municipality of Chacao usually 
obtains a favorable position in the statistics on violent crime. For instance only 11, or 0.5% 
of the 2,154 registered homicides committed in 2002 were committed in Chacao which 
means that relative to the numbers of inhabitants in the municipality the murder ratio in 
Chacao is only a ¼ of the average in the DMC.  
The municipal authorities of Chacao make use of such numbers to actively and 
credibly portray their area of jurisdiction as a “safe territory.” The above number is taken 
from statistics that are presented at the official Chacao web site with the title “Chacao: the 
safest municipality of the Metropolitan Area.” This kind of municipal image-making is not 
only maintained through the Internet but also with the use of large road-side posters, like the 
before-mentioned posters that greet all passers-by and visitors arriving by car with the text 
“You are now in safe territory” (see photo 4, chapter 1).  
 
While it is not clear to what degree the perceived safety of Chacao is real or imagined, 
statistics do seem to support the image of Chacao as a somewhat safer territory, and in the 
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end it is the way companies perceive the state of things that matter when investments are to 
be located. 
Clearly, many companies seem to share the La Tabacalera Nacional’s Director of 
Corporate Affairs’ opinion that, “The security factor is perhaps [Chacao’s] most important 
attraction.”  And that “It is of high importance for the location of the company that the area 
is safe.” The General Director of Kodak Venezuela agrees saying that, “The safety was 
fundamental [for the localization in Chacao].”  Kodak moved its national headquarter from a 
location in Libertador to their current location in Chacao just one week before the interview 
took place and the director is very enthusiastic about the contrasts between the 
municipalities, “The contrast [to Libertador] is enormous. I breathe out when I cross the 
border,” she says. 
Upon crossing the otherwise invisible border between the area of Libertador where Kodak 
used to be located, Sabana Grande, and Chacao, it is striking how the hectic activity on the 
street comes to a sudden stop. In Libertador the chavista Mayor has decided to tolerate 
informal commerce because of the high unemployment rates that would otherwise leave a lot 
of people without any legal source of income. In Chacao on the other hand, strictly enforced 
regulations prohibits any kind of informal commerce. In this situation many blame the 
chaotic situation in the traditional center on both chavista policies as well as on the street-
vendors that are often associated with crime and disorder. A prominent Professor of 
Architecture at the Central University of Venezuela (UCV), for example, says about the 
street vendors that, “Without doubt the delinquent moves with a lot of freedom in that 
environment.” 
This negative view of the activity of the street vendors is shared by the director of 
Kodak who says that the, “Fear of the street-vendors, violence and robbery,” was a major 
problem for them in Libertador. She says that, “While we were in Sabana Grande all the 
employees were assaulted or robbed at some point… The mobile or something like that.” 
Chacao has rather ‘successfully’ solved this problem then, by removing from public areas 
the people that are considered likely to commit crime, i.e. poor people. This solution has 
probably been politically feasible because the poor are not an important part of the electorate 
in Chacao, like they certainly are in Libertador; but just as important is the limited extension 
of Chacao that has also got the necessary resources to maintain a substantial police force. As 
the market and communications Director of LaFarge points out, “The municipality is very 
small and therefore it is controllable, in comparison with Libertador which is a monster.”  
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In accordance with this, the manager of a Chacao department of Banco Federal thinks 
Chacao is kept safer through more extensive surveillance and a higher density of police 
officers:  
“Surveillance! That’s what makes the inhabitant of Chacao a little more 
secure. We have a police in Chacao that’s specialized, professional. With 
enough personnel and vehicles to be present at all times, throughout the day, 
throughout the municipality, so as to avoid crime from happening.”  
For the companies, a safer environment provides them with more freedom of movement. It 
improves their access to services in the area, and it also improves the accessibility of their 
location, in the sense that clients and business partners feel they have less to fear. Kodak 
says that “[we] used to be trapped in our tower before. People didn’t go out because they 
were afraid” and that, “The clients like this location better, they are not afraid of coming 
here, the access is easier.”  
 The safety issue is related to accessibility also in regard to the availability of safe 
parking facilities. For the non-poor personal mobility in Caracas has become practically 
synonymous with the use of private cars and a lack of safe parking facilities would be a very 
serious draw back for any business location. As the Vice President of Statoil Venezuela 
points out, “All the buildings around here have parking facilities underneath. It would be 
impossible if you could not park safely.” 
 Some of the TNCs have special safety concerns regarding personnel that are visiting 
from abroad. Statoil, Kodak and DigiTel-Tim all mention the availability of high-standard 
hotels in the safe proximity of their own compounds as an important factor in terms of 
safety. While Chacao can offer such accommodation, Kodak complains that “In Libertador 
there is just one hotel that has an adequate standard.” Statoil also stresses the availability of 
residential areas nearby as an important safety attraction and points out that a problem with 
kidnappings in Caracas puts their foreign staff at particular risk. 
As mentioned, the increased freedom of movement that safety brings allows the 
companies to access and use the services-facilities in their area. The Director of Corporate 
Accounts at IBM Venezuela describes how it allows “[…] the employees to have a break in 
the work routine without it becoming a security problem.” he illustrates this point with the 
experience of Venezuela’s largest bank, Banesco, which just established new headquarters in 
the neighboring municipality of Baruta:  
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“Ciudad Banesco that they just constructed in Bello Monte is a client of ours. 
It is in Baruta. This is Chacao. Baruta is a pretty good municipality in terms 
of safety, but even so they have encountered problems. They have an open 
office solution there that means there is a higher noise level inside the 
building and some times the employees want to go out although they have a 
cantina inside and it’s not a safe area... because it’s closer to the quebrada [a 
riverside slum area].”  
The President of the real estate consultancy Miguel Chacón & Associates, shares that 
opinion but says that, 
“[…] the size of Banesco and the employment that Banesco will generate, 
directly and indirectly, moreover the impact of Banesco in the surrounding 
areas, qualifies it as an urban renovation project. They have only been open 
for three months. Within a year the Banesco-impact will make that area clean 
and nice. From all points of view. The real-estate around it will experience a 
price increase that will make a better conservation possible.”  
By this logic, the investments in the area will in itself contribute to making the area more 
attractive for investments, which means investments may have a sort of ‘positive spiral 
effect’ for a location where investments bring investments. The Corporate Accounts Director 
at IBM Venezuela explains that the concentration of businesses in there area makes the area 
more secure because it, “[…] brings the municipal government to supply it with more 
surveillance and with more people [police] and that makes it more difficult for the bad guys 
to act.” This understanding shows how political will to protect and foster localities that are 
receiving investments can be an important part of such a spiral. 
Another interesting perspective on the issue of safety is put forward by DigiTel-Tim, 
and IBM. These two companies are located in the southern end of Chacao in the 
administrative zone (urbanización) called CCCT. This zone consists of a shopping-mall 
complex with offices, restaurant and hotels, the IBM building and a separate office complex 
where DigiTel-Tim is located. The whole zone is entirely surrounded by multi-lane 
highways making the accessibility extremely difficult for pedestrians. The public transport is 
limited to a bus service from Altamira in Chacao that takes passengers to a bus-stop on the 
far side of the highway. On foot, the only way to enter the mall is through the car-entrance of 
the parking lot after first crossing the highway. 
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As DigiTel-Tim sees it,  
“this particular zone is less tempting for the criminals because it’s a strictly 
corporative zone. There is little to here by night so there’ll be fewer 
opportunities here for the criminals. The other thing is that this area is not in 
the axis of the metro [it’s surrounded by highways] and so the criminal, in 
order to get here, has to come by other means of transport. There is not any 
slum close by either, and so for someone to commit a crime here it requires 
much more planning than in an area within reach of the metro where they can 
run and hide in a train, or where they have more possibilities of mobility.” 
The Corporate Accounts Director at IBM confirms that “This is an area you have to have a 
car to get to” and also considers the area’s “fluidity of transit” [the surrounding traffic], a 
major security advantage.  
It is an interesting observation that the road infrastructure which provides excellent 
access to those who own a car, or can afford to use the CCCT-mall’s own safe taxi-service, 
at the same time effectively works to filter away unwanted, poorer, segments of the 
population that are considered more likely to perpetrate crime.  
As some of the above example indicate, the poor are considered a threat and it is 
likely that the extreme social inequality in Caracas contributes to the lack of safety that the 
city experiences. In Chacao this threat is contained an environments that in different ways 
are segregated from the surrounding city and the poor. The director of the construction firm 
Fertec is explicit in his view that, “The displacement from Libertador began 12- 15 years 
ago because of social factors – safety and separation from the poor.” 
Such safer environments are also secured directly in Chacao’s many private 
corporate and shopping areas with the use of closed circuit television and private, often 
armed, guards. Kodak’s new location is in such an area, the Centro Lido-mall (photo 6), and 
the director says it is “nice to have the services inside the Centro Lido.”  In Chacao there are 
seven such malls many of which offer facilities like hotels, swimming pools, tennis courts, 
office spaces, restaurants, cinemas and shops, all within areas that are privately protected 
and with parking places inside. Some of the malls even have exits directly to the highway, 
allowing people to drive there directly from their own property, without having to set foot in 
a public area (see photo 6). 
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Photo 6. VIP-entrance directly from the Highway to Latin America’s biggest 
shopping mall, SAMBIL. El Avila in the background. 
 
In the section on the so-called splintering geographies of post-Fordism in Chapter 2, Graham 
and Marvin (2001) argue that the increased flexibility the unbundled and decentralized 
provision of infrastructure gives, combined with the increasing power of private interests 
and investors in the development of infrastructure, provides developers with both the means 
(bypassing) and the goal (profit) to create new space-time compressions that exclusively 
serve to tie valued spaces closer to other valued spaces. In accordance with this, in my 
examination of how Chacao is able to offer a safer environment for investors, examples were 
given of how ‘local bypassing’ is used in such a way as to provide better mobility and 
exclusive access to certain spaces for presumably higher-income car-owners. In the 
urbanización CCCT, where IBM and DigiTel-Tim are located, the highways that surround 
the area and that provide excellent access for car-owners, also contributes to the safety of the 
territory by making it unattractive to the poor masses. In the same way, the private malls are 
easily accessible with car, while pedestrians need to pass scrutinous and armed guards at the 
entrance. Also, the architecture of Chacao provides abundant parking places exclusively for 
the users of the office buildings.   
 In the section on the political economy of infrastructure in Chapter 2 Harvey 
provides a useful perspective on how inherent tensions between the immobility of sunk 
capital and capital’s dynamic needs can fuel major changes in the urban geography.  In many 
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ways much of the infrastructure located in the traditional CBD of Caracas, in Libertador, can 
be said to represent large sunk costs that have now become a barrier for further 
accumulation. Libertador is deteriorating as Chacao develops and it can be helpful to 
understand this major change in terms of an infrastructural redevelopment of the city where 
the goal is to maintain production profitable. To the degree that the infrastructure available 
in Libertador does not satisfy the needs of today’s investors, there is a risk for that 
infrastructure to be considered a sunk cost that will be ‘left dead’ because it is more 
economic to construct anew at another location. From my examination of the importance of 
safety when companies locate their investments, it was clear that the infrastructure required 
for parking cars safely is considered insufficient in Libertador. A lack of safe parking places 
seriously affects the accessibility by car to such a degree that safe parking places are 
considered a necessary condition for a functional business location. According to Fertec, 
“new buildings in Chacao are always built with underground parking places.” 
Harvey suggests (chapter 2) that speculative planning strategies associated with 
urban entrepreneurialism and competition are likely to produce upward and downward 
spirals of urban growth. Caracas might be witnessing such a spiraling development, because 
it is probable that, as the Account Manager of Sun Microsystems suggests, it’s Chacao’s 
position as a relatively rich municipality that makes it “possible to improve the avenues, the 
health-care and the safety situation.” So assuming that the municipality receives a 
significant part of its income from the companies that invest there, and that safety is a 
significant factor for localizing investments there, the municipality of Chacao should 
become ever more capable of improving the relative safety of its territory, and with it, its 
attractiveness. And the result might be further polarization of the urban territory because if 
one locality successfully manages to lure investments into its space, there will also be 
another locality that failed to do the same.  
  
These findings on the importance of safety does seem to support Sassen’s assessment that 
proximity to what she calls producer-services continues to be relevant for companies’ 
location strategies, but it is given a slightly different angle. Several of the interviewees 
describe a situation where they depend on having services nearby, but primarily out of safety 
concerns. Services, like banks, hotels and restaurants need to be within what can be called a 
“safe proximity”; otherwise they are hardly accessible at all. I will look more closely at the 
relevance of proximity to other firms and services in a later section. 
 62 
4.2.3 Clean and well kept environment 
The importance of a clean and well kept environment as a factor for the localization of 
companies is perhaps less obvious than the importance of for example safety. It was pointed 
out by several of the interviewed companies however that they appreciate the relatively 
cleaner appearance of Chacao. It is important to stress that many and large areas of Caracas 
are in a very bad sanitary state. The waste disposal in many of the hilly slum areas is very 
irregular when it exists at all. During heavy rainfall this can create problems also outside the 
slum areas as garbage is washed down the streets and onto roads and highways, occasionally 
blocking them for traffic. Most of the slum areas are in Libertador and the garbage problem 
affects Libertador much more than it does Chacao. Also the central areas of Libertador are 
filled with temporary informal sales-booths during day time and this is bound to generate a 
significant amount of garbage. When compared to the neighboring municipalities then, and 
especially to Libertador, Chacao’s appearance is almost strikingly clean. It adds to Chacao’s 
clean and orderly appearance that it does not host any street-vendors so often associated with 
the somewhat chaotic and unsafe situation in Caracas’ other central areas. The director of 
Kodak, for example, seems to rate the cleanliness almost as high as safety when she says that 
“the safety and the cleanliness is what’s most important to us.” And that, “the cleanliness of 
the municipality is much better than in [Libertador]. You don’t see street-vendors and 
garbage in the streets.”  
Kodak is not the only company that understands urbanistic order and cleanliness to 
be related and significant factors. Another of Chacao’s large TNCs, Statoil Venezuela, says 
that, “that it is clean and orderly is an important attraction of Chacao.” Accordingly, 
DigiTel-Tim explains that,  
“[…] the most important reasons [for the displacement of companies 
Eastwards] have to do with the deterioration of the western part of town. The 
‘climate’ is deteriorating, although there are good buildings there. This is 
connected to the politics of the [chavista] government in the municipality of 
Libertador. The politics of that government implies that they will be more 
permissive in letting the urban aspect deteriorate. They’ll let the sidewalks be 
blocked [i.e. by street-vendors]…”  
While, in Chacao on the other hand “the environment is pleasant, it’s relatively clean. 
There’s not as much pollution. Not as much urbanistic disorder.” 
 The General Director of TelCel also points out that Chacao offers urbanistic order. 
That it is clean, and that that there’s recycling. He says that, “you definitely breathe a 
different air when you’re in a municipality like this, and that’s something people look for.” 
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The Market and Communications Director of LaFarge explains that, before, the central 
government understood the importance of such a clean and ordered atmosphere much better, 
that, 
“Under Caldera [President Chavez’ predecessor] there were two very good 
programs for Caracas. They were called ‘Caracas I love you’ and ‘A token of 
love for my city’. They consisted in a state-private cooperation in the 
beautification, the ornamental part, of the slums and of the public areas 
respectively. In ‘Caracas, I love you’, they painted the barrios and in ‘A token 
of love for my city’ the First Lady led an effort to brush up different areas. It 
was business and government working together. The First lady would find a 
place that needed brushing up and then look for companies that would 
sponsor it.”  
You can still find some monuments adorned with company logos scattered around Caracas, 
and many of the slum-areas in the hills along the highway still have a colorful, almost 
picturesque appearance from afar – but now these programs have both been cancelled. The 
General Director of TelCel thinks they have been taken up by the local government in 
Chacao however. He says that, “basically the government of Chacao wants to transmit 
something of cleanliness and order to these private companies.” For example, “Every time 
there is demonstration, there is always a lot of graffiti et cetera and in Chacao, the day after, 
TelCel and various other companies take care to help clean and paint.” 
Apart from such occasional efforts, the municipality surely depends on the capacity 
of its own public services that rely on funding through the municipal budget. Having the 
sufficient funds and by making a priority out of keeping its territory clean and well kept the 
authorities in Chacao seems to have managed to create an environment that is attractive for 
investors and contributed positively to the municipality’s image as different. 
4.2.4 Prestige 
The municipality of Chacao is a ‘modern’ area for big-business and up-scale residences. Its 
many high-rise buildings and fenced-in villas provide a strong contrast to most of its 
neighboring areas and the wealth these assets represent are likely to contribute to its social 
status, making it prestigious to be located within its borders.  
 The two construction companies that were interviewed corroborate this assumption. 
The Project Administrator of Constructora A.S.S.A says they, “[…] have many projects in 
Chacao. Because the middle class looks for an area that’s a little more fresh. In El Rosal 
and Chacao there is everything. And they [i.e. the clients] know.” In other words the 
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potential real estate-customer perceives Chacao as an area that is ‘fresher’. Fertec also says 
that, “This area is more exclusive. They try to make it a mini-Wall Street” and that, 
“especially the last 6 years many have moved [from Libertador]. These days they keep 
moving, among other reasons because a location in Chacao gives prestige.” 
 This is confirmed by a Department Manager from Banco Federal who has no 
problem admitting that, “Status is part of the reason why so many banks are moving to 
Chacao and El Rosal.”  
 Recently arriving from Libertador, Kodak is very clear about the advantage Chacao 
has as a “[…] a more ‘corporate’ location – it represents the company better, that is to say, 
the localization in Chacao is prestigious, it improves the image of the company.” 
 
What makes Chacao a more ‘corporate’ location is of course the presence of a high number 
of other corporations in the municipality’s down town area which is of limited extension. 
The many, and often quiet new, high-rise constructions give an almost futuristic touch to 
Chacao within the confines of an otherwise run-down Caracas (See photo 7, next page). 
 
Photo 7. Centro Lido, Chacao. Photograph: www.chacao.gov.ve 
 
Both the national as well as the transnational companies seem very conscious about the 
image implied by their location. DigiTel-Tim for example, considers Chacao to be, “a very 
interesting location from the point of view of a corporation that wants to have an image.” 
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And this is precisely because, “the area is a renowned business area in the city. Where the 
important firms are.”  In fact he says that, 
“the proximity is not really that important when it comes to maintaining the 
contact with these other firms. Our business transactions don’t happen 
through the main office here. It’s about prestige.” 
The Corporate Accounts Director at IBM explains that one of the reasons why IBM moved 
from Libertador some thirty years ago was to have a building of their own and not to rent, 
because it “gives prestige to have an asset like this (own building).”  This is especially he 
says, because all the other telecommunications firms in Chacao are renting their offices and 
simply pay to have their logo on the building. 
 
The prestige that a location in Chacao involves is related to any other advantage that Chacao 
may have and that the public, or at least the corporations and their clients, are aware of. The 
on-going agglomeration of prestigious firms in Chacao contributes to the prestigeousness of 
the area, which in turn contributes to further agglomeration, and again a sort of benevolent 
spiral-effect is produced. The conception of the municipality as a prestigious location is of 
course also connected with the image building efforts of the local authorities that are seeking 
to attract investments. I will look closer at those initiatives in a later section.  
4.2.5 Proximity to other firms and services 
A main concern for this thesis is to understand the reasons for the on-going agglomeration 
process in Caracas where many of the most important companies are locating within each 
others proximity in Chacao. In this section I will explore to what degree such proximity is a 
goal for the interviewed companies, either directly in the production process or in other more 
indirect ways.  
 
All of the interviewed companies consider the geographic proximity to other companies 
important, but the companies differ in how they justify this need for proximity. Some 
companies emphasize that it is convenient to be close to the suppliers of inputs required in 
the operation of the companies. These inputs can be anything from the cement required by 
the construction companies to the more general category of ‘producer services’ that, as 
Sassen (chapter 2) argues, should also be considered part of the supply capacity of an 
economy. 
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As an example of how it can be convenient to have the first, ‘traditional’, category of 
inputs nearby, the Market and Communications Manager at the construction company 
A.S.S.A points out that to carry out projects it is not necessary for them to leave Chacao at 
all. They order cement from LaFarge (LaFarge figures among the companies that were 
interviewed for this study) and they get materials from distribution centers that are also 
located within the municipality. Likewise with the Director of Corporate Affairs at the 
tobacco company La Tabacalera Nacional who says their location in Chacao is advantageous 
in the sense that their suppliers are all located nearby. 
 Other companies prefer to emphasize the importance of proximity to suppliers of 
inputs in the form of different kinds of producer-services, also essential for the effective 
operation of the companies.  
For the transnational companies that were interviewed, the importance of having 
hotels of good standard nearby was pressing. DigiTel-TIM says that hotels are important 
because, “as a multinational company we have personnel in other parts of the world and 
when they come here we have somewhere to put them.” Along the same lines Statoil says 
that, “The security of the area and the proximity of good hotels are important when there 
are visitors.” 
As shown in the chapter on safety, the generally unsafe situation in Caracas increases 
the importance of having essential services nearby, because the immediate ‘range’ of the 
employees is limited to areas that are considered safe. The extra safety provided by the 
security personnel in the municipality of Chacao contributes to extend that range as a larger 
area can be considered safe. This observation illustrates Sassen’s (1994) view that the 
provision of security should be considered a producer-service. Along the same line, The 
Vice-President of Statoil also considers the residential areas in Chacao as a ’service’ that 
doubles as an important security factor, because they allow the employees to live safely 
within proximity of their place of work. IBM also points out how advantageous it is that, 
“the employees have the possibility to pay all their services close to here,” in the sense that, 
“there are facilities that allow the employees to have a possibility to have a break in the 
work routine without it becoming a security problem.” 
All though all the banks have subsidiaries in Chacao, the Director of Corporate 
Accounts at IBM says he often needs to go to the center in Libertador to meet with his 
business partners in banking because they usually meet at the banks headquarters, many of 
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which are still located in the West. In fact, he says, “If I had business only with banks I 
would move to the center [in Libertador], because it’s a long way for me to go to the banks.” 
When IBM does not move to center it is because, “we have clients in industry and 
telecommunications also. For telecommunication clients this place is ideal. TelCel is just 10 
minutes away, it’s in Chacao. DigiTel is here. […] For the industry I have to go quite far, to 
Sucre." For IBM the most important advantage of Chacao is that, “Being here allows us to 
be at the same distance to clients that are in which ever limit of the DMC.” But he does not 
think that the benefits of proximity is what has been driving the agglomeration process. He 
explains that, 
“The concentration of companies in Chacao is not due to a premeditated 
plan. The companies realize that it’s a strategic place for what it has to offer 
and they move here. In the end in they’re all here together: close to the 
clients.” 
The President of the real estate agency Miguel Chacón & Associates also considers the 
advantages of that proximity to other companies of secondary importance to the 
agglomeration process, which in his opinion is primarily driven by other advantages that the 
area has to offer:  
“The companies are interested in being in an urban space where there is a 
quality of life, environmental quality, personal safety, because they have 
contracts with their employees that have world wide standards where they 
have to guarantee them a lot of safety and quality in their stay. They come 
with standards that are so high that the only urban space that fulfills them is 
here. They are not here because they need to be together. They’re here 
because this urban space satisfies the global standards they’ve got.” 
In the previous section, the Vice President of Organizational and Human Management at 
DigiTel-Tim said that being in the area where the important firms are is not so important in 
itself (for the contact with the other firms) but indirectly, because it brings prestige. 
 That said, the proximity that agglomeration gives seems to be valued by companies 
for a variety of reasons, not least because it means being close to firms that receive their 
outputs. This seems to be especially true for companies like IBM, and also for another high-
tech company like SUN Microsystems, but also Banco Federal. These companies can all be 
classified as producer-service providers, and proximity to their clients allows them to offer 
better services. Banco Federal explains that while many banks have headquarters in the 
center in Libertador they all take care to open, “[…] a department here in the East [in 
Chacao] where they manage these corporate clients and the large scale operations.” This is 
also true however for a company like Fertec, a construction firm with long traditions in 
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Chacao, whose Director says that, “Its better for Fertec to construct buildings that are as 
close as possible.”  
The director of Kodak Venezuela, on the other hand, says such proximity is not 
important “because the access is good for our clients.” In other words proximity would 
have been more important in an area with less favorable accessibility – which again is to say 
that it is the relative proximity mediated by the transport networks that matters. I will discuss 
the accessibility issue in a later chapter.  
 
In this section the proximity to other companies has been described as a relevant factor for 
how attractive the companies consider a locality to be, and there is no doubt that Chacao 
satisfies the companies’ requirements well in this respect. Proximity has a relational aspect 
to it, linking it to issues of accessibility and infrastructure. The issue is also closely and 
importantly linked to questions of prestige and safety.  From what Sassen writes about the 
increasing importance of access to so-called producer services it would be reasonable to 
expect such services to play a significant role in contemporary agglomeration processes, and 
the evidence from Chacao does indeed suggests that both the providers and the consumers of 
producer-services understand their proximity to be clearly beneficial for the production 
process. 
4.2.6 Proximity to national and local public administration 
The companies that have been locating in Chacao over the years have done so in spite of the 
fact that almost all of the Venezuelan national public administration is located in the 
traditional CBD of Caracas, in Libertador. The increased responsibility that has been 
awarded the local municipal authorities within the DMC in the course of the decentralization 
process that was initiated in 1989 may to some degree have compensated for possible 
inconveniences that the distance to the national authorities brings. I will try to explore 
whether that distance is perceived as inconvenient by companies in Chacao and, if so, 
whether it constitutes a significant drawback for Chacao as a business location.  
 
In general the companies do not describe it as very problematic to have the national public 
administration in Libertador. Most consider it more or less inconvenient, while some 
actually say it is an advantage. Chacón & Associates and A.S.S.A belong to the last 
category. The President of Chacón & Associates explains this positive view of the distance 
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to the national public administration thus, “[…] it’s a good thing, because the public sector 
brings the [real-estate] prices down. Because demonstrations are generally concentrated 
around the installations of the public sector. Close to the presidential palace you will find 
buildings with a lower value. It’s a situation particular to Venezuela and third world 
countries. I imagine that in London one would want to live close to the ‘number ten’.” 
It is important to keep in mind that the national government is fiercely opposed 
among many of the wealthier inhabitants of Caracas. This is indicated by the voting patterns 
in the August 2004 referendum, where a large majority of 80% (www.cne.gov.ve) of the 
inhabitants in the small but relatively wealthy municipality of Chacao expressed their wish 
to recall the mandate of the sitting President. Perhaps this antagonism towards the 
government sheds some light on the Project Administrator at A.S.S.A’s exclamation that, 
“Thank God we’re not in the center closer to the public administration!” 
Several other companies also portray the distance to the national public 
administration as unproblematic, but rather than suggesting that the distance is advantageous 
they emphasize that it is easily overcome as a result of the decentralization public functions 
and/or of the efficient means of transport available on Chacao. The Director of Corporate 
Affairs at Tabacalera Nacional for example, explains that, “the accessibility and means of 
transport, like the metro, permit relatively fast travel to the buildings of the central 
government’s administration buildings.” The Account Manager at SUN Microsystems 
shares this opinion – he says that, “The Courts, the Ministries and the National Congress 
are easily accessible by the metro – which’ proximity is very favorable for Chacao.” Also 
the Market and Communications Manager at LaFarge agrees with this, pointing out that in 
Chacao it is easy to access not only the metro, but also the intracity highways: 
“It is not important for Lafarge to be close to the public administration and 
the government. When necessary to go there, Libertador is close as the metro 
and highways supply a good connection with Libertador. There is the 
highway, Francisco de Miranda, and the Cota Mil [highway] that takes you 
East or West. We are well situated. The internal mobility is good.” 
The Director of Kodak Venezuela also seems to share the perspective that the good 
accessibility to means of transport outweighs the distance, but she also emphasizes that with 
the decentralization process the visits to the center are less frequent - the distance she says, 
“is not a problem at all. We only go to SENIAT [the tax office] and it’s within reach of the 
metro. […] The rest of the things are done at the municipality of Chacao that’s here next 
doors, and also it’s possible to do a lot of things thru the Internet when it comes to Chacao.” 
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This quote illustrates how the decentralization process has brought the public 
authorities closer (literally) and it also suggests that Chacao is better prepared to take 
advantage of digital infrastructures in its service-provision. The interviewees from DigiTel-
Tim and Banco Federal also emphasize that the decentralization of public authorities has 
been beneficial to their operation in Chacao as it effectively decreases the distance to these 
functions. It is reasonable to assume that having the public administration in the traditional 
center is a disadvantage for these companies although only Banco Federal and IBM admit 
this explicitly.  
For Banco Federal the distance to the public authorities in the traditional center is a 
disadvantage that is compensated for by the comfort and accessibility that Chacao offers. 
The Account Manager at IBM explains that to have the government in the traditional center 
complicates things: 
“You have to have an appointment and get to it in time. So it’s obviously an 
advantage to be close to it. To give it service and get on time to the 
appointments. And obviously, to lower the costs of transport. Because all the 
representatives need to get there by taxi and return, and the company pays 
that. Its not the same with a taxi that goes to PDVSA [in Chacao] for 4000 Bs 
in 10min, and a taxi that goes to the center for 8000Bs. Both ways son 16000 
against 8000, double costs, and this expense weighs significantly.” […] We 
go there a lot. We need to have appointments beforehand and go in taxi. It’s 
not that “time consuming”, but a taxi bill of 16000 Bs [7 US$] is significant. 
It is interesting that it is the cost rather than the time factor that is problematic for IBM. This 
observation does not support Sassen’s suggestion that the time-factor has become so decisive 
for how business is organized spatially that locations offering proximity to services remain 
attractive even when they are expensive. Proximity remains important however. From the 
interviews it is reasonable to conclude that proximity to the public administration is 
important although some companies are reluctant to admit that proximity to the present 
government is something they seek. On the other hand the companies’ location in Chacao 
provides good access to metro and/or highways, and the decentralization process has brought 
more government functions down to a municipal level, both administratively and 
geographically. The government functions attributed to the municipality of Chacao are 
particularly easily available for the companies located in the municipality because its limited 
extension guarantees proximity and also because in Chacao they are increasingly 
administered through the Internet. The use of Internet in the public administration of the 
municipality should be considered a novel way of overcoming the spatial friction that the 
geographic distance between the companies and the municipal offices implies, no matter 
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how small it is. In accordance with Graham (2001) however the uneven use of such digital 
infrastructure within the DMC can also be understood both as a symptom and a cause of the 
uneven development of space-time relations in the city. It would not be conceivable that 
Libertador make priority of offering on-line access when almost half of the households in 
that municipality do not have a connection even to basic networks for telephony. 
4.2.7 Physical accessibility 
As shown in the sections on safety and proximity, physical accessibility definitely plays an 
important part in the companies’ assessment of areas for their potential location. In the 
following, some further considerations of the physical accessibility factor will be presented. 
Physical accessibility is complementary to digital accessibility and also relates to the 
possibilities of connection existing between a certain place and other places (Zoido et al. 
2000). The physical accessibility of an urban area is defined by the availability of various 
transport infrastructures serving the area. Such transport infrastructure can take the form of 
roads, highways, metro lines, bus connections, parking places, sidewalks and so on. Because 
physical accessibility so often is part of definitions of centrality, this topic is particularly 
relevant to the discussion of the rise of Chacao as a new CBD in Caracas. Transport 
infrastructure generally increases accessibility, although as pointed out in the section on 
safety, it will not increase accessibility equally for all user groups.  
 
The interviewed companies all consider the physical accessibility of Chacao to satisfy their 
demands relatively well. Chacao has 4 metro stations within the reach of its central axis, and 
three major highways pass through the municipality from East to West. Although the 
companies emphasize the importance of the road infrastructure, the metro is also considered 
important and especially when it comes to connecting Chacao with the traditional center 
where the road infrastructure seems to be saturated and circulation is far from satisfactory.  
According to the Director of Corporate Affairs at La Tabacalera Nacional, “the 
infrastructure [in Chacao] is newer than in other municipalities. And has better 
maintenance, principally in terms of viality.” Considering the standard of the road 
infrastructure however it’s important to keep in mind that the roads running through Chacao 
also need to pass through other municipalities where their maintenance may not be equally 
satisfactory. For the Vice President of Statoil Venezuela this means that “Getting to and 
from the international Airport (Maiquetía) is a challenge, you have to go through town 
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[Libertador] and it takes time.” Keeping that in mind, a location in Chacao still means that 
the access to the three large highways that represent the only practical way of moving across 
the city with a car is better than in alternative locations in Libertador. 
For the director of Kodak Venezuela the access is better in Chacao because, “Here 
we’re closer to the all the important exits. The highway is closer and we don’t have to pass 
by all the traffic of the Boulevard [de Sabana Grande] and all the traffic of Libertador 
Avenue.”  The Vice President of Organizational and human Management at DigiTel-Tim 
underlines that this as an essential advantage: “The criteria for maintaining the company 
here have to do with the privileged location in the city – the accessibility, the viality.” 
The Corporate Account Manager at IBM, situated next doors to DigiTel-Tim, says 
that the accessibility implies a centrality in the sense that, “Being here allows us to be at the 
same distance to clients that are in which ever limit of the DMC.” As mentioned in the 
section on proximity to other firms and services, the Director of Kodak Venezuela does not 
consider it too important to be close to the clients precisely because “the access is good 
[…].” In a sense then the good accessibility of the area allows the firm to locate there even if 
the clients are at a distance. 
In a similar fashion the Director of Fertec also emphasizes the importance of the 
viality and centrality that Chacao has to offer: “The Highways and the accessibility by car 
are very important. The viality is an advantage of Chacao. Chacao has a central location 
and this is also its great advantage. Fertec is close to its clients.”  He explains that Chacao 
has the necessary resources to keep the streets in a better state and that Chacao counts with 
its own traffic police that helps to resolve accidents and maintain order in the streets. For the 
Account Manager at SUN Microsystems the order that has been obtained means that, “There 
are less street vendors in Chacao and that makes it safer and easier to travel by car.” 
 At Fertec it is stressed that the municipality’s relatively new buildings are all 
equipped with underground parking places. Adequate viality would of course be of little use 
without infrastructure for parking. The existence of such facilities in Chacao strikes an 
important contrast to Libertador that, according to the interviewee from Banco Federal, 
“[…] doesn’t have anything near to enough parking spaces.” She says that in effect the 
over-ground transport systems in the center have collapsed and that “the only thing that 
works is the metro.”  
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There is more variation between the companies however as to how greatly they value 
accessibility by public transport. As mentioned in the section on safety, the two companies 
that do not have the metro nearby, IBM and DigiTel-TIM, in fact considers this to be an 
advantage because it complicates the access for non-car owners (i.e. the poor). The rest of 
the companies are more or less content to have the metro close. The General Manager at 
TelCel, for example, says that “It’s important to have the metro close because of the 
employees that don’t have their own vehicle.” While the metro is less relevant for Statoil 
where only two or three employees do not drive a car to work.  
The metro is probably more important to service-providers as banks because it 
facilitates the access for the clients. As Banco Federal, for example, that says “The proximity 
to the metro gives us a larger volume of operations because of the concentration of people in 
these zones.” Generally the metro is considered a safe a safe way of traveling, and perhaps 
the most important access way to the traditional center. The Account manager at SUN 
Microsystems considers the four metro stations in the Chacao area to be a great advantage 
for the municipality:  
The banks and the financial institutions have located along the metro line – 
the closer to the metro, the more expensive the property. The Courts, the 
Ministries and the National Congress are easily accessible by the metro – 
which’ proximity is very favorable for Chacao.” 
 
Harvey’s understanding of the inherent tensions in capitalist society allows him to predict a 
constant redevelopment of the urban infrastructural landscape of cities as new configurations 
of space-time mobilities are required to maintain profitable production, with the implication 
that old investments in infrastructures are left behind as sunk-costs whenever the 
development of a new area results more profitable (chapter 2). This interpretation of urban 
change seems to be compatible with my observations from Caracas where formidable 
infrastructure investments in the form of buildings and transport-systems in the traditional 
center that has supported a flourishing CBD for over 50 years seems to have become 
saturated, and that development has taken the form of new construction in the East rather 
than of an upgrading of the existing center. This understanding fits well with what has been 
said about unsatisfactory parking facilities in Libertador – such parking facilities have 
become necessary for accessibility by car, and while this has not been planned for in the 
older development of Libertador, Chacao offers underground parking space as a standard. 
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The saturation of the over-ground transport infrastructure in Libertador may also 
have be contributed to increasing the importance of the metro system for the companies that 
are located in Chacao but still to some degree dependent on access to the government offices 
in the traditional center.  
It has also been suggested in the interviews that the administrative decentralization, 
or segregation, of the administration of the road infrastructure has further capacitated the 
provision of adequate road-infrastructure in the municipality of Chacao that as a result has 
more resources, and also more possibilities to follow its own distinct policy of road 
maintenance and order.  
4.2.8 Municipal administration / Financial incentives 
In order to understand the agglomeration process in the municipality of Chacao it is 
necessary to also understand how possible entrepreneurial strategies of the municipal regime 
contribute to making the municipal area more attractive for investment. In chapter 4.3 I will 
look at the municipal authorities of Chacao’s strategies and possibilities to attract investors, 
what interests us here is to understand how the policy of the local political administration is 
perceived among the investors that were interviewed, and how this adds to the other 
perceived advantages of the area that I have discussed above. 
 
There are two expenses that seem to be of special concern for the companies: one is the tax 
that is paid as a percentage of the annual revenue; the other is a fixed tax that the companies 
pay for the use of the land for commercial purposes, the patente.  
Some of the interviewed companies expressed discontent with the tax policies of 
Chacao, the Director of Corporate Affairs at La Tabacalera Nacional, for example, says that:  
“In the case of our line of trade, cigarettes, Chacao is the municipality that has the highest 
taxes of the DMC. This constitutes a barrier for our principal business partners, our 
distributors and clients, that wish localize in Chacao.”  For La Tabacalera Nacional then, 
the tributary policy of Chacao is understood as a clear territorial disadvantage. The Director 
of Kodak also says that, “The taxes in Chacao are a little higher than in Libertador, but the 
cost of security and m² compensate for that.”  In the same way the Director of Fertec is also 
quick to mention that although the municipality offers many advantages, “The disadvantage 
is the higher costs, the taxes.” 
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According to President of the real estate consultancy Miguel Chacón & Associates however,  
“[…] the tributary structure (taxes) in Chacao is minimized in comparison with the rest of 
the municipalities. This is a big incentive for the moving of firms towards this urban space 
because it minimizes the cost-structure” 
With a concrete example of a transnational company that the agency is currently 
assisting in moving to Chacao he explains that the reason they decided to locate in Chacao 
were the financial advantages that the administration in Chacao offers. When moving to 
Chacao the TNC will be, “[…] paying 20% more for the land use tax, the patente, but its 
doing so because they [Chacao] are lowering the revenue taxes some 30%.” 
 
What seems to be a difference in opinion between the companies regarding the tributary 
policy of the Chacao government might be attributed to the existence of two different taxes 
where one is higher, and one is lower, because it is not always clear which tax it is referred 
to. It is also possible that this difference of opinion arises from the fact that the tax incentive 
mentioned by Chacón is offered to companies that are new to the municipality and therefore 
does not affect the companies that are long established in Chacao. Chacón explains this as a 
clearly entrepreneurial initiative on the part of the Mayor of Chacao:  
“[...] the Mayor is a leader that wants the firms to come to his territory. So the 
Mayor gives services, safety, facilities, incentives, because he is a Mayor that 
has understood that his municipality as urban space is a company. And that 
he has to create demand for this company.” 
And the Mayor does seem to have been successful in the marketing of his municipality; at 
least the interviewed companies seem to conceive of the local government as a relatively 
efficient entity, less plagued with corruption, and more capable of maintaining a good 
environment for business, especially regarding safety and order in street. As the Project 
Administrator at A.S.S.A says, “In Chacao there are rules, and the rules must be obeyed 
because the police are there.” 
The Vice-President of Organizational and Human Management at DigiTel-Tim says 
the most important advantage with the Chacao government is the way it has maintained a 
continuity in its administration, that, “Having passed by now 3 or 4 periods of municipal 
government, it has maintained a line of stimulation of the development of this kind of real 
estate [i.e. corporate and upper-range residential].” 
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The company interviews present an overall positive view of the governance strategy of the 
municipality of Chacao. The municipality, with its policy of stimulating a certain kind of 
development by attracting investors, is considered by the companies as responsive to their 
interests. The success and nature of the financial incentives remain unclear, but it is an 
interesting policy aspect that I will look into in chapter 4.3. As noted by Harvey in chapter 2, 
the implementation of entrepreneurial policies aimed at attracting investments in a 
competitive environment could result in competitive tax cuts in a ‘race to the bottom’ that in 
the end might benefit only the investor and undermine general public interest. Greater 
territorial unevenness is also if the investors agglomerate in the area that offers the best deal. 
So far Chacao is probably able to maintain a tax level that is perceived as high by some of 
the companies because the sum total of advantages Chacao offers is understood to outweigh 
that disadvantage.  
4.2.9 The real estate market 
As mentioned in the background chapter, the real estate market in Caracas and especially in 
Chacao has been far from static over the last two decades. The economic liberalizations 
since 1989 and the financial crisis of 1994 have had very direct implications for the 
construction and availability of office buildings that might prove to be very relevant factors 
for the companies’ location within the DMC.   
 
According to the President of the Real Estate Consultancy Miguel Chacón & Associates the 
most important reason for investing in Chacao is that, “Chacao constitutes an urban space 
that represents a relatively stable economy. That is to say that it’s an urban space where 
there are mechanisms of offer and demand that generate an increase of prices. This makes it 
rentable to acquire real estate in Chacao.”   
 In other words, by locating offices to Chacao the investment is more likely maintain 
or even increase its value. And because that perception is common also among the banks, it 
is relatively easy to finance investments in Chacao: “The banks are ready to finance the 
real-estate infrastructure in Chacao because in Chacao the asset that would serve as 
guarantee to obtain the loan is correspondingly valuable.” In his opinion this situation 
along with the safety benefits of Chacao, clearly weigh up for the somewhat higher prices in 
the area.  
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In a similar manner, the director of Kodak Venezuela balances the higher tax 
spendings in Chacao against much lower security costs, but she says the m² price was 
actually lower in Chacao. It is important to take into account that Kodak Venezuela has been 
downsizing and that, according to the Director, the tower Kodak moved out of in Sabana 
Grande in Libertador was of a very high standard, although badly located. The Director of 
Corporate Affairs at La Tabacalera Nacional also says the company “found a better real-
estate offer (cost-benefit) in Chacao,” without specifying which factors were part of that 
cost-benefit equation. 
 LaFarge moved from Libertador to a prominent tower, the Torre Country Club in 
Chacao, that they had constructed and owned, at the very beginning of the 1990s. The 
company, which before was The National Cement Factory, was bought by the French TNC 
LaFarge during the crisis year of 1994 after which “The company established itself in the 
current tower because it was the economically rational thing to do.”  It could seem that the 
comments by LaFarge coincide with the dynamics in the real estate market as these were 
described in chapter 1. The financing of a number of recently built office buildings in 
Chacao came to an abrupt halt as a consequence of the financial crisis of 1994 that forced 
many owners to realize their real estate assets even at a loss and that pretty much converted 
the real-estate market of Chacao into a market for letting.  
A market for let office-space of first-class, particular to Chacao, is likely to 
contribute to lower entry-costs lower for enterprises that are establishing in the city. This 
particularity of the real-estate market in Chacao, along with lower security costs, may 
explain why some of the companies say it is more economical for them to have the offices in 
Chacao.  
 
The Manager of the Chacao Department of Banco Federal tells us that when the banks’ 
headquarters are still located in the Traditional CBD in Libertador, with all the problems 
with the transport and communication systems there, it is only because, “they’re big 
constructions. They can’t move easily… The constructions are valuable. And they were made 
precisely for the purpose and there’s no way to move them.” As large constructions, 
representing enormous investments, the headquarters of the largest banks are good examples 
of how such investments, as sunk costs, produce an inertia in that scenario of change 
depicted by Harvey in chapter 2 as an inherent part of the dynamics of the urban landscape 
in the capitalist city.  
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 The Project Administrator of the construction company A.S.S.A, says there has been 
much less demand for new office-buildings in Caracas the last few years: “there is a crisis in 
the construction sector and little demand.”  This description of a falling demand coincides 
with what was said in chapter 1 about how the general economic liberalization of the 
Venezuelan economy may have contributed to a proliferation of new corporate real-estate 
construction that was put out for sale in the beginning of the 1990s but later made available 
as let office space following the financial crisis of 1994. The sudden availability of let office 
space along with fear of crisis situations like that of 1994 is likely to have made it less 
tempting to invest in large new real-estate projects although the demand for offices in 
Chacao is said to have been stable. 
4.3 Administrative issues 
In chapter 1 the administrative situation of the DMC was presented and it was suggested that 
the combined fragmentation and decentralization process could have contributed to the 
agglomeration in Chacao. The findings from the company interviews support that suggestion 
in the sense that many of those factors that are decisive for the companies’ location in 
Chacao – such as a better safety situation, a cleaner and more pleasant environment, and 
prestigeousness – can be maintained and improved thanks to Chacao’s status as an 
independent municipality.  
4.3.1 Administrative fragmentation and economic segregation 
Since its creation as a municipality, there has been a great disparity between the per capita 
revenue of Chacao and that of the remaining 4 municipalities of the DMC (see figure 1, 
chapter 1). The decentralization law also acknowledged the municipalities much greater 
control with the income generated on municipal territory, reducing cross subsidies very 
much to the benefit of Chacao that enjoys significant tax revenue from the economical 
activity on its territory. This income allows Chacao to satisfy the requirements of its 
investors better, not least regarding the provision infrastructure and services. 
 
An Architect at Chacao’s Office for Strategic Planning confirms that maintaining the level 
of investments and business activity is strategically important because the companies that are 
located in Chacao represent a very significant income for the municipality. She estimates 
 79
that on an average about 80% of the municipal budget stems from taxes levied on the 
companies.  
 
Table 1. Income Budget for Chacao 2002 (Billions of Bs.) 
Type of Income Amount
Patentes for Industry y Commerce tax 51,140,740,000
Urban Real Estate taxes 2,591,387,372
Other taxes 2,913,872,389
Other Non-Tax Income 911,734,081
Various 5,159,652,810
Income from Property 1,382,480,000
Situado Municipal (State-municipal transfer) 2,554,872,414
Total Ordinary Income 67,010,029,694
Total Extraordinary Income 2,865,794,688
Total Income 69,875,824,382
Source: www.chacao.gov.ve 
 
From table 1, which shows the incomes budgeted with in Chacao for 2002, it can be seen 
that the Patente for Industry and Commerce clearly represents the most significant income 
for the municipality. In accordance with the estimation from the Office for Strategic 
Planning, this post constitutes more than 73% of the budget.  
The patente is a tax that companies in Chacao pay annually for the right to operate in 
the municipality. Another interesting post on the budget is the Situado Municipal which is a 
municipal subsidy that the states distribute among their municipalities. In the World Bank’s 
(1997) report on the decentralization process in Venezuela, it is concluded that in average 
for all the municipalities in Venezuela, “The Situado Municipal is […] the largest source of 
revenue to municipalities in aggregate accounting for approximately 70% of municipal 
revenue.” Comparing Chacao’s budget with the World Bank’s estimation of the country 
average, it becomes clear that Chacao’s incomes do not represent those of an average 
municipality as the Situado Municipal barely accounts for 3.7% of the total revenue. All the 
states are required by the LORM (1989) to transfer a certain sum, the Situado municipal, to 
the municipalities that they comprise. 70% of the this sum is distributed according to the 
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number of inhabitants in the municipality and as a small municipality Chacao receives a 
modest sum, but this does not explain why the Situado Municipal represents such an 
insignificant share of the total budget. Rather, this disproportionality stems from the 
tremendous weight of the income from the patentes. 
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Figure 2. Revenue from patentes of industry and commerce in Chacao 
(adjusted for inflation). Source: Gonzalez 1998. 
 
Figure 2 shows the impressive growth in tax revenues during Chacao’s first years. The 
increase in revenue from companies located in Chacao from 1993 to 1997 is as high as 
595,9%, a number that illustrates the massive movement of companies towards Chacao as 
well as the beneficial effects of this agglomeration process for the municipal budget. 
According to Gonzalez (1998) it also shows the result of Chacao’s efforts to establish an 
effective system for taxation. While the low level of economic activity in many 
municipalities often rules out all possibility of establishing an effective system for taxation 
at a sustainable cost this was possible in Chacao precisely because of its initially favorable 
economic and social conditions. 
4.3.2 Competitive climate 
The substantial rents Chacao attains from office activity illustrates how important inter 
municipal competition for investments has become after the decentralization of the DMC. 
Given the continued agglomeration of companies in Chacao, Chacao has clearly succeeded 
in maintaining its competitiveness in this respect. This success in attracting investments 
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reflects Chacao’s many favorable assets, some of which result from the municipality’s 
proactive, or entrepreneurial, policy towards investments and its status as municipality.  
 The territory of Chacao’s ability to compete for investments was greatly improved 
with its status as a municipality and the decentralization. For one thing it made it much 
easier to convey a positive image of the area when it is no longer part of a poverty-ridden 
municipality like Sucre. Chacao’s municipal status also defines it a statistical entity, and as 
such it comes out very favorably in intra-city comparisons. The crime rates for instance, that 
are a very important factor for the interviewed companies, are a case in point: When 
compared to an extensive municipality like Libertador, with at least 26 times as many 
inhabitants and infinitely more complex social challenges, Chacao is bound to come out well 
in crime statistics. Chacao has a reputation for being a safe area and the statistics support 
this, but there might be other equally safe areas the size of Chacao that are located within the 
borders of Libertador or Sucre and therefore are not counted as statistical areas. The same 
would be true for other numbers that carry status, such as average income or connectivity to 
Internet. The very application for independence that was put forward by representatives of a 
Chacao residents can in a sense be understood as an ‘entrepreneurial’ strategy aimed at 
encouraging local growth.  
4.3.3 Entrepreneurial strategies 
After municipal status was achieved the Chacao administration has proactively sought to 
improve its competitiveness by employing typical entrepreneurial initiatives. The municipal 
administration of Chacao is very conscious of the importance of securing investments, and a 
new office has recently been opened with that explicit task: La Oficina de Promoción de 
Inversiones (Office for the Promotion of Investments). The Promotion of Investments 
Manager explains that the creation of her office is a way of consolidating Chacao’s strategy 
of attracting business. A strategy that coincides with the, “international tendency of City 
Marketing” where the idea is, “to market all you have to offer in order to attract investors, 
and also people that would like to become residents.” She adds the qualification however 
that, “This is being done in many part of the world, but with cities. We are trying to do this 
with a municipality.” According to the Promotion of Investments Manager, Chacao intents 
to convey to potential investors an image of, “a municipal government that is transparent 
and service-oriented, that offers tax incentives, that is strategically localized, and that offers 
first class infrastructure.” Her job is to make this image reach the investors and to improve 
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it. The Internet is used intensively to spread information about what Chacao has to offer and 
the advances that are made. Chacao conducts surveys among the users of its territory in 
order to chart and respond with better service. Among the interviewed companies, Statoil 
Venezuela, praised this particular initiative of the Chacao government and many of the other 
companies also expressed that they were content with how their local government responded 
to their needs, especially regarding services and safety. As observed in chapter 4.2, there 
was also widespread agreement among the companies that the municipality offered a 
strategic location in terms of access to services and infrastructures. The financial incentives 
mentioned were less known among the company interviewees. The major financial incentive 
that the Promotion of Investments Manager mentions is a 50% tax discount during the first 3 
years for companies that are new to Chacao. The only company that mentioned it in the 
interviews was the real-estate consultancy Miguel Chacón & Associates, but this is not 
surprising however as this incentive is aimed exclusively at companies that are new to the 
municipality, and was introduced in 2003. As mentioned in chapter 4.2, the President of 
Miguel Chacón & Associates did consider the incentive very effective, and he also praised 
the Chacao administration’s general efforts to cooperate with the private sector by running 
the municipality as a company that they need to create a demand for.  
 An Architect at the Office for Strategic Planning explains that Chacao maintains its 
attractive position as a business location because of what it has to offer the investors and in 
that respect “Chacao’s position is favorable because its one of the richest municipalities of 
the country. That means it can do things because it has money. And it also means prestige.”  
If Chacao started off with a relatively high income resulting from the relative density 
of business on its territory, the good income has in turn favored the municipality’s efforts to 
increase that density further – between 1997 and 2004 the revenue from economic activity 
increased by 57,6% (Estimation based on Alcaldía de Chacao 2004). A ‘benevolent spiral 
effect’ consolidates Chacao’s position as an attractive location within the DMC as income 
from the firms that have established on municipal territory is reinvested in the same territory 
with the explicit aim of keeping it attractive. The high municipal spendings on law 
enforcement illustrates this point (see table 2). 
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Table 2. Distribution of spendings per sector in Chacao, 2001. 
Sector Billions of Bs % of total  
Housing, Urban Development and Services 12.0 17 
Municipal Police  11.7 17 
Social Security 10.9 16 
Management 8.8 13 
Municipal Traffic Police (IATTC) 5.7 8 
Metropolitan Government 5.3 8 
Education 2.2 3 
Culture 3.5 5 
Health 3.0 4 
Civilian Protection 2.2 3 
Budgetary Corrections 1.8 3 
Social Development and Participation 1.3 2 
NGOs 0.7 1 
Total 69 100 
Source: www.chacao.gov.ve  
 
Table 2 shows the spendings budget of Chacao for 2001. Taken together the spendings on 
police and traffic police amounts to 25% of the total municipal budget. Both the interviewed 
companies and the municipality itself emphasize safety as an important distinguishing 
feature of Chacao within the DMC and the fact that law enforcement is by far the biggest 
post on the budget indicates that Chacao has achieved this reputation for lower crime rates 
by means of its superior resources.  
4.3.4 Variations in quality of infrastructure and services 
After the responsibility for the provision of services, including the police, were transferred to 
the local level, the quality of the services depend much more on the different municipalities’ 
ability to generate sufficient income, which, as figure 1 (chapter 1) shows, varies 
significantly. Chacao’s per capita income was more than 5 times the average for the 
remaining municipalities in the DMC. In this situation many of the local governments have 
simply proved unable to cover the costs of these new expenses (Mitchell 1998). 
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 The decentralization process in Caracas was indeed expected to force the 
“municipalities [to] find new methods to finance public goods through cost recovery” 
(World Bank 1997, 53). And, in effect, the municipalities have been looking for alternative 
ways to finance services. Mitchell (1998) observes that, ”To provide these services, 
municipalities [have been] forced to negotiate with private interests in exchange for 
favorable zoning ordinance and approval for construction permits – what amounts to a de 
facto privatization of infrastructure” (Mitchell 1998, 9). According to Mitchell this also 
happens in Chacao. For example, “planners working for Chacao have demanded such things 
as the repair of water pumps, the paving of streets and the installation of street lights in 
exchange for construction permits” (Mitchell 1998, 11). Of course Chacao will have better 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the private interests in such negotiations compared to the other 
municipalities as the territory of Chacao is currently that which is most attractive to 
investors. 
 Such public-private partnerships, though informal or extra-legal, are said to be 
common and widely acknowledged but Chacao’s Office for the Promotion of Investments 
denies the existence of this kind of cooperation (Interview w/Director, Mitchell 1998). To 
the degree that the municipalities are forced to use this kind of public-private partnership for 
the construction and maintenance of infrastructured services, the possibilities for a publicly 
planned development are clearly reduced. And in addition to the decentralization’s impact 
on municipal finances, the possibilities for quality service provision will depend even more 
directly on the interests and presence of private investors in the area.  
There are indeed significant differences in the quality of infrastructure provision 
across the DMC, and most notably between Chacao and the rest of the municipalities in the 
DMC. Today, 13 years after the parish of Chacao obtained municipal status, some of the 
differences, especially from neighboring Libertador and Sucre, are easily observable. Most 
obvious perhaps is the great variation in the standard of the roads. According to a 
Sociologist at Penthouse real estate consultancy a telling example is how “the Av. Libertador 
is ‘express’ in Chacao but ‘normal’ in Sucre.” Often streets that pass through the DMC will 
be lit up only where they pass through Chacao where the authorities can afford the necessary 
maintenance and surveillance. Other differences are less easily observed but the national 
census of 2001 reveals that the percentage of registered households without running water is 
3.5 times higher for the DMC than for Chacao, and that while 41.7 % of registered 
households in the DMC are without connection to the telephone network, the number for 
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Chacao is only 6.5%. And while only 62% of registered households in the DMC have their 
garbage collected, 95% of the Chacao households do.  
These data reveal some of the striking contrasts between administrative areas in the 
DMC, and given the relevance of these factors to the companies’ location strategies, the 
uneven development is likely to continue. Little is being done to prevent a spiraling 
development where the municipalities are more and more dependent on private investments 
to generate a revenue that in turn is needed to maintain and encourage future economic 
activity on municipal territory. The municipalities have no politics on fiber optic 
infrastructure but, as was demonstrated in chapter 4.2, the fiber optics networks are likely to 
coincide with and reinforce existing business agglomerations.  
 
In Chapter 2 Leitner and Sheppard (1998, 296) pointed out the close connection between 
urban entrepreneurialism and inter urban competition; and the case of Caracas and Chacao 
has shown that there is also good reason to associate entrepreneurial policy with intra urban 
competition. The form of strategic planning undertaken by the Office for the Promotion of 
Investments in Chacao falls well within the definition of entrepreneurialism as described in 
chapter 2. As was said in that chapter most of the theory on the subject of entrepreneurialism 
or city marketing deals with inter-city relations, but, as pointed out by the manager of this 
Chacao office, the inter-municipal, intra-urban relations in Caracas can be considered 
parallel to the relations between cities in this literature. Furthermore, Harvey’s (1989) 
argument that entrepreneurial (inter city) competition for investments is a zero-sum game 
that is bound to produce losers as well as winners – in other words a game that produces 
polarization between places – is a fitting description of the intra urban competition resulting 
from the administrative fragmentation and decentralization in Caracas. The increased 
importance of competitiveness has not simply been an incentive for administrative 
efficiency; it has contributed to an uneven economic development that has strengthened the 
economic polarization of the city along the new administrative borders. In this context 
Chacao’s employment of entrepreneurial policies to attract investments can indeed be related 
to polarization at an intra urban scale in terms of both municipal income and the quality of 
service provision.  
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5. Conclusions: Agglomeration and polarization 
The agglomeration of private investments in Chacao has a variety of causes. The interviewed 
companies consider the most important factors for their location in the municipality of 
Chacao to be digital and physical accessibility, availability of services, safety, and prestige. 
Chacao is considered to satisfy these locational preferences better than other areas in 
Caracas, and it has a privileged position as a target for investments in both a relative and 
absolute sense. Initially the deterioration of the traditional CBD, in part resulting from the 
saturation of the built environment in Libertador where both the formal and informal 
economic activity has outgrown the existing infrastructure (insufficient roads and a lack of 
parking spaces), led investors towards alternative areas towards the East where there was 
room for expansion. What was then the parish of Chacao quickly emerged as a strategic 
location especially in terms of physical accessibility owing to its topography, its 
geographical centrality, its well functioning infrastructure for transport (roads, parking, 
metro), and its prestige as a wealthy area with relatively few social problems. The 
displacement towards Chacao was intensified in the wake of economic and political reforms 
after 1989. Significantly, Chacao’s independence as a municipality has benefited the locality 
by securing it greater control with the income generated on municipal territory. This has 
made it possible to improve the standard of infrastructure in the municipality and to 
proactively implement policies aimed at attracting investments.  
 The growing importance of advanced ICTs for economic activity is also significant 
for how new centralities have developed in Caracas. The companies that are agglomerating 
or re-agglomerating in Chacao seem to require high-speed access to digital infrastructure in 
their day-to-day operation. This infrastructure has been developed in an unregulated and 
liberalized environment by various private enterprises, and its limited extension is largely 
due to the condition of profitability imposed on investments in new canalization. The various 
and overlapping fiber optic networks largely coincide with the central areas of Caracas that 
have a high presence of major companies. 
 The displacement of companies towards Chacao is self-reinforcing in at least three 
ways: Firstly, the companies that move to Chacao bring their tax-contribution with them and 
it is this revenue that makes it possible for the Chacao administration to further improve the 
attractiveness of the municipality with respect to the factors mentioned above through 
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entrepreneurial strategies. Secondly, the concentration of major companies in Chacao is in 
itself an important pull-factor – it makes it necessary for parts of the service sector, reliant 
on proximity to their client companies, to move there too, and it also adds to the territory’s 
status as a prestigious business area, a status that contributes to further agglomeration. 
Thirdly, the limited extension of fiber optic networks makes a location outside the central 
areas more costly for companies that require digital access. While this contributes to 
maintain the demand for office space in a well connected business area like Chacao, the 
presence of potential clients in the area also makes it a target for further developments of 
ICT-infrastructure.  
 The resulting spiral of growth, local to Chacao, is paralleled by a spiral of 
disinvestment in other parts of Caracas with consequences in the form of an intra-urban 
economic polarization that increasingly manifests itself territorially according to the recently 
drawn administrative borders. 
 
The economic, administrative and infrastructural restructuring described above is consistent 
with scenarios associated with a shift towards post-Fordism. The changes, in terms of 
economic liberalization, political decentralization and the introduction of new ICTs in the 
economy, are reflected in the city’s geography in important ways and illustrate how the 
outcome of political-economic and technological changes are not given. Concepts like ‘the 
death of distance’ and ‘the end of cities’ prove highly inadequate to describe the geographic 
developments of post-ICT Caracas. Instead the case of Chacao provides useful insight into 
the complexity of contemporary processes of urban change – the introduction of new 
infrastructure with novel capacities in terms of space/time compression is not innocent of 
existing power relations and within an unbundled and unregulated regime of provision any 
simple decentralization resulting from a ‘neutralization of distance’ is unlikely. In Caracas a 
re-agglomeration in Chacao has been observed and with it a relative economic and 
infrastructural marginalization of less central areas is taking place. The corporations in 
Chacao are integrated with the global economy through networked infrastructures that 
‘bypass’ the municipality’s immediate surroundings.  
 At the same time the case of Chacao shows why the causal role of new ICTs in the 
transformation of urban geographies should not be overestimated. ICTs are one of a variety 
of decisive factors for the location of corporate investments, and moreover that, these other 
factors have an indirect influence on the development of the ICT-infrastructure in the sense 
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that, to the degree that private providers of infrastructure are looking to maximize their 
profits they are likely to focus their investments within areas they consider to have a high 
density of potential clients – along with the agglomeration of business there is a parallel 
agglomeration of communications infrastructure and it is not clear which is cause and 
which is effect.  
 Apart from digital connectivity the interviewed companies’ location strategies rely on 
factors that illustrate a continued importance of physical spaces of representation and 
interaction for which spatial concentration is still important. The agglomeration process in 
Chacao shows that physical proximity is still a factor in the geographical organization of 
economic activity. For instance, the availability of producer services is fundamental and a 
physical location in Chacao is attractive because it guarantees the availability of such 
services within what I have called a ‘safe proximity’. In this way the issue of proximity 
between firms has to with the possibilities for interaction, but a density of important firms 
can also change a territory’s qualities as a representative space, as illustrated by the prestige 
Chacao’s has achieved as a ‘corporate location’. 
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Appendix 
List of interviewed 
Government officials 
Municipal administration of Chacao.  
• Architect at the Oficina Local de Planeamiento Urbano (OLPU, Local Office for 
Urban Planning) 
• The Manager of The Office for Promotion of Investments  
• Architect at the Office for Strategic Planning 
Municipal administration of Libertador 
• Architects at the Office for Strategic Urban Development  
Metropolitan municipal government. 
• The Director of Urban Planning at the Office for Urban Planning and Environmental 
Management 
Local Experts 
• Professor of Architecture at the Department of Urbanism, UCV 
• Economist working with the real estate consultancy Miguel Chacón & Associates 
• Sociologist, working with the  real estate consultancy Penthouse 
• Local representative of The United Nations Development Program in Caracas 
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National and multinational companies in Chacao 
• Banco Federal. The Manager of the Chacao Subsidiary. 
• Constructora A.S.S.A – Arismendi & Schummer. The Project Administrator. 
• DigiTel-TIM, Venezuela. The Vice President of Organizational and Human 
Management. 
• FERTEC. The Company Director. 
• IBM Venezuela. The Corporate Accounts Director. 
• Kodak Venezuela. The General Manager. 
• LaFarge (Fábrica Nacional de Cemento). The Market and Communications Manager. 
• La Tabacalera Nacional. The Director of Corporate Affairs. 
• Miguel Chacón & Associates. The President. 
• Statoil Venezuela. The Vice President, Chief of Staff.  
• Sun Microsystems de Venezuela. The Account Manager for the Petroleum Sector. 
• TelCel-Bellsouth. The General Manager. 
Suppliers of telecommunications infrastructure 
• TelCel. A high ranking Engineer 
• NetUno. Engineer, Manager of Corporate Projects 
• CANTV. A high ranking Engineer. 
• AES (Electricidad Caracas). The General Manager. 
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